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Lifting Our Veil of Ignorance:
Culture, Constitutionalism, and Women's
Human Rights in Post-September i i America
CATHERINE POWELL*
INTRODUCTION
While we live in an Age of Rights,' culture continues to be a major
challenge to the human rights project. During the drafting of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)2 in the 194os and
during the Cold War era, the periodic disputes that erupted over civil
and political rights in contrast to economic, social and cultural rights
could be read either explicitly or implicitly as a cultural debate.' Some
scholars and commentators claim that with the collapse of the Cold War
and in the aftermath of the September ii terrorist attacks, the clash
today is even more explicitly a cultural one-between Western and other
cultures.4 Despite attempts by President George W. Bush to reach out to
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School, Human Rights Institute. J.D., Yale University; M.P.A., Princeton University; B.A., Yale
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Law Workshop, Cornell Feminist Theory Workshop, Fordham Faculty Workshop, Georgetown
International Legal Theory Workshop, NYU Law Review Workshop, Yale Law School Human Rights
Workshop, and at Princeton University and Wellesley College. I am also grateful to Lama Abu-Odeh,
Jose Alvarez, Karen Engle, Martha Fineman, Martin Flaherty, James Fleming, Katherine Franke,
Abner Greene, Laurence R. Heifer, Louis Henkin, Tracy Higgins, Vicki C. Jackson, Bob
Kaczorowski, Paul Kahn, Linda McClain, Henry Monaghan, Judith Resnik, Susan Sturm, Edward
Swaine, Chantal Thomas, Ian Weinstein, Leti Volpp and Benjamin Zipursky for their support and
invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Thanks are also due to Jay Chien, Tahira Clarke,
Geeta Kohli, Seema Saife, Katy Schuman, and Nycole Thompson for their superb research assistance,
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I. Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. i,
U.N. Doc. AI8io (1948), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm.
3. Karen Engle is surfacing some interesting evidence of this in her review of these debates.
Telephone interview with Karen Engle (Apr. i9, 2ooi).
4. For discussion of the culture clash theory in the post-Cold War era, see, e.g., SAMUEL P.
HUNTINGTON, CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996); BERNARD LEWIS,
ISLAM AND THE WEST (993); Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in Is
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Muslims following the September Ii terrorist attacks,' statements by
U.S. government officials have reinforced the perception of a
civilizational divide between the Western world and Muslim world by
"characteriz[ing] the war against terrorism as a battle for 'civilization'-
indeed, a 'crusade.' 6 Gender has figured prominently in this perceived
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
For discussion of the culture clash theory following the September ii attacks, see, e.g., Lisa
Schiffren, How the Judges Forced the President's Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2004, § 4, at 13
(describing the debate over gay marriage as "a distraction from the real cultural war, which is being
fought in the Middle East against terrorists and anti-democratic fanatics."). Much of the post-
September I I commentary positing a clash of cultures builds on Samuel Huntington's earlier work or
notes the relevance or popularity of his theory in the wake of the attacks. See, e.g., Stanley Kurtz, The
Future of "History": Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington, Post-September it, POL'Y REV.
(Hoover Institution), June & July 2002, available at http://www.policyreview.org/juno2/kurtz.html.
Stanley Kurtz says of Huntington's work:
Read in the wake of September It, it is more than clear that Huntington's book is filled, not
with impermissible "essentialism," but with useful generalizations.... How did Huntington
manage to predict the future so uncannily? ... He acknowledged and explored what others
failed to recognize-that America was already engaged in a war of sorts with the Islamic
world, even before September is.
Id.; see also Joel Achenbach, The Clash, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 200i, at W-17 ("There's no doubt that
Huntington has been in ascendancy since September it. His book, five years after publication, has
rocketed onto the best-seller lists."); Gershom Gorenberg, Clash of Civilizations? No Thanks,
JERUSALEM REPORT, Oct. 22, 2001, at 33 (noting that following the September iI terrorist attacks,
Huntington's Clash of Civilizations rose to twenty-fourth on the sales rankings of Amazon.com);
Thomas Meyer, A Fundamental Fallacy, TIMES HIGHER EDUC. SUPPLEMENT, Nov. 9, 2001, at 15 ("Since
the September it attacks on the United States, there has been a revival in the debate about clash-of-
civilizations theory."); Ahmadzukiman Zain, Send Clear Message to the World, Says Hariri, MALAY.
NAT'L NEWS AGENCY, Oct. I4, 2003 (quoting Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri as saying, "Certain
parties that have a problem with Muslims understood [September is] as an affirmation of
Huntington's thesis about clash civilizations. But this is not true.").
In the aftermath of the September I I terror attacks, Samuel Huntington has apparently backed
away from his theory to some extent. See Achenbach, supra (Paraphrasing Huntington, following an
interview with him, Achenbach notes that Huntington recognizes that the Islamic world is not a
monolith, and that the September i "terrorists did not represent Islam-this wasn't an authentic
civilizational clash [although] it might just lead to one."); Gary Dorsey, Choosing a Clash of Cultures
to Blame, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 21, 2001, at IF ("[A]lthough Huntington has rapidly backpedaled since
Sept. ii, saying the terrorist attacks cannot exemplify his theory, the Clash of Civilizations idea has
been raised repeatedly to explain the supposed enmity within Muslim nations for Western culture and
pointed to as the fuel that fires fundamentalist rage.").
5. Following the attacks, President Bush met with Muslim leaders, took off his shoes before
visiting the Islamic Center in Washington, D.C., and stated publicly that Americans must not target
people with hate crimes because they belong to specific groups. See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the
Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1581 (2002) (citing Dana Milbank & Emily Wax, Bush Visits
Mosque to Forestall Hate Crimes: President Condemns an Increase in Violence Aimed at Arab
Americans, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at AI).
6. Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, supra note 5, at 1582; see also Peter Ford, Europe
Cringes at Bush "Crusade" Against Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2001, at AI (describing concerns
among political and religious leaders in Europe that Bush was promoting the idea of a "clash of
civilizations" by-however unintentionally-invoking the idea of the Christian crusades against
Muslims, when Bush warned Americans that "this crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take
awhile"); Michael Hirsch & Roy Gutman, Powell's New War, NEWSWEEK, Feb. I1, 2002, at 24
(describing George Bush's use of "axis of evil" and describing the fight as one "the President has
[Vol. 57:331
LIFTING OUR VEIL OF IGNORANCE
culture clash, for example, with the Bush administration's use of Afghan
women as cultural icons in need of liberation-a claim that helped justify
the overthrow of the Taliban government in Afghanistan.'
According to this culture clash notion, the West is governed by
rationality and enlightenment, rather than culture.8 By contrast, "[t]he
notion that non-Western people are governed by culture suggests they
have limited capacity for agency, will, or rational thought."9 As such, the
West is assumed to provide a culturally neutral baseline or measuring
rod against which to evaluate the progress of the rest of the world, whose
cultural practices are said to clash with what is perceived to be a Western
liberal human rights tradition. To be fair, one prominent culture clash
scholar, Susan Moller Okin, acknowledges that "Western cultures, of
course, still practice many forms of sex discrimination," but asserts that
Western liberal cultures have generally "departed far further from [their
patriarchal pasts] than others.""0 In fact, in developing this gendered
dimension to the clash, Okin concludes that female members of "a more
patriarchical minority culture [may] be much better off if the culture into
which they were born were either to become extinct... [or if the culture
were] encouraged to alter itself so as to reinforce the equality of
,,11I
women ....
starkly cast as civilian vs. barbarism"); Katha Pollitt, Egg on the Brain, NAION, Mar. 4, 2002, at Io
(describing the statement by Attorney General John Ashcroft that "Islam is a religion in which God
requires you to send your son to die for him. Christianity is a faith in which God sends his sons to die
for you."); President Bush has Proffered a Cabinet-level "Office of Homeland Security," AVtATiON WK.
& SPACE TECH., Sept. 24, 2001, at 22 (quoting President Bush's statement made to a joint-session of
Congress in which he said, "Either you're with us, or you're with the terrorists."). The impact of these
statements has been amplified by the fact that the U.S. government, as part of its "war on terrorism,"
has explicitly engaged in several types of racial profiling against people who appear "Middle Eastern,
Arab, or Muslim," including by targeting these groups for detention, interviews, and selective
enforcement of deportation orders. See Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, supra note 5, at 1577-8o.
"Through these actions and these statements, the American public is being instructed that looking
'Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim' equals 'potential terrorist."' Id. at 1581.
7. Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on
Cultural Relativism and Its Others, 104 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 783, 783 (2002) (in analyzing the
liberation of Afghan women as a justification for the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in fall 2001, Abu-
Lughod discusses "the dangers of reifying culture, apparent in the tendencies to plaster neat cultural
icons like the Muslim woman over messy historical and political dynamics."); see also Karen Engle,
Liberal Internationalism, Feminism, and the Suppression of Critique: Contemporary Approaches to
Global Order in the United States, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427 (2005); Ratna Kapur, Un-Veiling Women's
Rights in the War on Terrorism, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 211, 216 (2002).
8. For discussion and critique of this notion, see Leti Volpp, Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior,
12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 89 (2000). Volpp notes, "According to the West, culture-not the high culture
of opera, but the culture of daily activities, quotidian practices and rites-did not rule the lives of the
rational thinkers of the West as it did those who were governed by tradition, folk ways, and tribal
affiliations." Id. at 98.
9. Id. at 96.
io. Okin, supra note 4, at 16.
I I. Id. at 22-23.
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Several scholars have criticized this gendered dimension of the
culture clash hypothesis as unnecessarily pitting gender against culture
and for its monolithic approach to culture and, relatedly, religion."i
Further, as Leti Volpp points out, this culture clash approach both
diverts attention away from sex inequality closer to home and exoticizes
third world women in ways that put the spotlight on cultural restrictions
while obscuring other restrictions and obstacles these women face.'3
While culture clash theorists and other scholars have focused mainly on
cultural practices affecting non-Western women (as well as minority and
immigrant women in the West), far less attention has been given to the
complex ways in which cultural claims are advanced to limit women's
human rights more generally in the West, much less in the United
States. 4 Consider, for example, the fact that the primary cases advanced
in the debate over whether human rights are universal or culturally
relative-female circumcision, bride burning, honor killings, veiling,
polygamy-are largely drawn from non-Western States. 5
By contrast, this Article examines cultural arguments made in
12. Several of the essays published along with Okin's essay in the same book raise these sorts of
criticisms. See generally id. at 41. See also Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Cultural Particularism as a Bar to
Women's Rights: Reflections on the Middle Eastern Experience, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995); Ann Elizabeth
Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307 (1994) [hereinafter Mayer,
Universal Versus Islamic]; Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003); Leti Volpp,
Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1181 (2001).
13. In her perceptive critique, Volpp notes that the "excessive focus" by Susan Moller Okin on
"minority and third world sex-subordinating cultural practices" positions "other" women as "perennial
victims," thereby denying "their potential to be understood as emancipatory subjects"; deflects
attention away from structural factors that shape cultural practices; and obscures "issues affecting
women that are separate from what are considered sexist cultural practices." Volpp, Feminism Versus
Multiculturalism, supra note 12, at 1204.
14. Scholars have noted the disproportionate focus on cultural restrictions on non-Western
women. See, e.g., Azizah Y. AI-Hibri, Is Western Patriarchal Feminism Good for Third World/Minority
Women?, in Is MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 4, at 46 ("Why is it oppressive to
wear a head scarf but liberating to wear a miniskirt?"); UMA NARAYAN, DISLOCATING CULTURES:
IDENTITIES, TRADITmONS, AND THIRD WORLD FEMINISM (1997) (comparing dowry deaths in India to
domestic violence in the United States); Lama Abu-Odeh, Comparatively Speaking: The "Honor" of
the "East" and the "Passion" of the "West", 1997 UTAH L. REV. 287, 287-90 (challenging the different
treatment of crimes of honor in the Arab world and the killing of women in the heat of passion in the
United States); Hope Lewis, Between Irua and "Female Genital Mutilation": Feminist Human Rights
Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. I, 2 (1995) (noting "recent escalation in
Western media attention" focused on female genital mutilation); Catherine Powell, Introduction:
Locating Culture, Identity and Human Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201 (1999) [hereinafter
Powell, Locating Culture] (noting that the tendency in the human rights field is to assume cultural
objections to human rights are only made by non-Western states); Sunder, Piercing the Veil, supra note
12, at 1461 (noting that the focus on Islamic fundamentalist efforts to limit women's rights is not
matched by analysis of Christian fundamentalism as a bar to women's rights in the United States);
Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, supra note 12, at 1181 (critiquing claim that minority and
third world cultures are more subordinating than culture in the West).
15. When referring to nation-state, I use capital "S" in contrast to "state" in the context of the 50
states of the United States, for which I use small "s."
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opposition to the United States' ratification of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW)' 6 during hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in 2002. By offering a home grown illustration reflecting how cultural
claims are advanced to limit women's human rights in the United States,
this Article provides a window into the complexity of cultural arguments.
Because this Article assumes that there is much we still do not fully
understand about how culture operates, its focus on the United States
serves as a warning against oversimplifying cultural claims at home or
abroad. While cultural claims are often genuine expressions of shared
ways of life, such claims cannot necessarily always be taken at face value.
In the United States and abroad, cultural claims are sometimes
manipulated to advance other interests, including those of male elites,
and are, therefore, frequently contested by the very women in whose
name these claims are made. In fact, women have often challenged the
validity of such cultural claims or have provided alternate interpretations
of their local culture or religion.'7
Although this Article investigates cultural claims made by CEDAW
opponents in the U.S. ratification context, the failure of the United
States to ratify CEDAW has been conventionally understood as
grounded in concerns that the Convention is incompatible with U.S.
constitutionalism." A fresh look at the ways constitutional objections in
the United States have masked cultural assumptions about women is
particularly urgent in light of renewed attention to women's human
rights and constitutionalism in the context of new constitutional
frameworks in Afghanistan and Iraq.'9 Commentators have expressed
concern regarding the role of religion and culture as potential obstacles
for Afghan and Iraqi women to achieve constitutional rights, noting, for
example, that constitutional provisions in Afghanistan and Iraq
envisioning a role for Islam create "tensions in the constitutional
16. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res
34/I8O, U.N. GAOR 3 4th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979) [hereinafter CEDAW],
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/hrml/menus/b/eicedaw.htm.
17. See, e.g., Sunder, Piercing the Veil, supra note 12, at 1399 (describing this in the context of the
work of women living under Muslim law).
I8. Scholars analyzing earlier CEDAW ratification efforts note the ways in which the United
States has used constitutional objections as an obstacle to ratification. See, e.g., Malvina Halberstam,
United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 49 (1997); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Reflections on the
Proposed United States Reservations to CEDAW: Should the Constitution Be an Obstacle to Human
Rights?, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727 (1996).
19. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, A New Democracy, Enshrined in Faith, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at
A3I (describing guarantees for women in Afghanistan's draft constitution); Edward Wong, Draft for
New Iraqi Constitution Includes Curbs to Women's Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005, at Ax (noting
that the new Iraqi Constitution is more restrictive of women's rights than the interim Constitution,
which Americans had more influence in drafting).
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structure" that may be at odds with securing women's equality.0 An
important backdrop for these concerns is the fact that the U.S. invasion
of Afghanistan was in part justified as a means to save "women of cover"
(as President Bush called the Burka-clad Afghan women).' This Article
draws attention to women's human rights in the context of U.S.
constitutionalism to explore ways in which tensions created by the U.S.
constitutional structure have operated as a cover for cultural assumptions
about American women in the context of CEDAW ratification.
In rejecting CEDAW, the United States has hidden behind the
banner of constitutionalism 22-particularly notions of federalism and
limited government inherent in U.S. constitutionalism. But, as testimony
offered during the CEDAW ratification debate reveals, the United
States' failure to ratify CEDAW can be usefully understood as grounded
in fear that ratification would disrupt traditional cultural understandings
of women's role in the family and in society. In fact, some of the
CEDAW opponents who testified against ratification framed their
objections explicitly in terms of culture and traditional gender roles.
Rather than adopting this explicit cultural framing of the Convention,
however, the United States, in its official position on CEDAW has
expressed reservations to the treaty in terms of constitutionalism. 3 By
veiling traditional cultural understandings of women behind the lofty
claim of constitutionalism, the United States has largely been able to
20. Feldman, supra note i9 (speculating that in light of the fact that the Afghan draft constitution
makes Islam the nation's official religion, "tensions in the constitutional structure will have to be
resolved later by the Supreme Court [such as whether] laws requiring women to dress modestly [will
be found] unconstitutional as a violation of women's rights, or constitutional as in accord with the
teachings of Islam); see also Linda C. McClain, Negotiating Gender and (Free and Equal) Citizenship:
The Place of Associations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1569, 1590 (2004) [hereinafter McClain, The Place of
Associations]. Referring to the Afghan Constitution, McClain asks:
How will the constitution's guarantees of freedom from discrimination and equal rights and
duties before the law reconcile with the provision that "no law can be contrary to the sacred
religion of Islam" and that laws protecting the family (especially the child and mother) shall
not be contrary to "the sacred religion of Islam"?
Id. (referring to AFG. CONST., arts. 2, 22, 54 (2003), available at http//www.constitution-afg.com/
Adopted%2oConstitution.htm)). For discussion of similar concerns about potential tensions between
Islam and women's equality raise in the context of the emerging constitutional framework in Iraq, see
Wong, supra note 19 ("A working draft of Iraq's new Constitution could cede a strong role to Islamic
law and could sharply curb women's rights, particularly in personal matters like divorce and family
inheritance.").
21. Abu-Lughod, supra note 7, at 783.
22. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 342 (1995) (noting that countries will sometimes invoke constitutional
objections of debatable quality as a way of avoiding international obligations).
23. As discussed in Part I and III, the United States has proposed a set of reservations,
understandings and declarations (RUDs) to limit the impact of CEDAW on domestic law. See infra
notes 58-59 & 138 and accompanying text. These RUDs are framed in terms of constitutionalism and
perceived constitutional constraints. Because family law and other areas of domestic law related to
gender have traditionally been regulated by state and local government, the constitutional constraints
of federalism and limited government are reflected in the proposed RUDs.
[Vol. 57:33 1
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avoid serious international criticism of its failure to ratify CEDAW. By
contrast, countries that have more explicitly relied on cultural or
religious objections to women's human rights in their reservations to
CEDAW have attracted significant international criticism.4
While women's human rights activists in the Muslim world are, in
the words of Madhavi Sunder, "piercing the veil" 5 of religion and culture
as justifications to deny these women their rights, this Article suggests
that American women lift the veil which cloaks cultural assumptions
underlying U.S. resistance to ratifying CEDAW. Rather than dwell on
the poetics of the veil as a symbol of women's oppression in Afghanistan
and other parts of the Muslim world, 6 this Article argues that American
women could benefit from considering that, today, Afghanistan has
ratified CEDAW, while the United States has not.27 In the analysis
offered here, the veil serves as a symbol of how U.S. exceptionalism"i has
blinded American women from recognizing the potential of the
international human rights framework to offer substantive norms
concerning women's equality. In fact, our focus on the perceived
subordination of women in other cultures (signified in the United States
by the veil) has helped to obscure the degree to which the rights of
American women are limited by aspects of our culture. With the title,
"Lifting Our Veil of Ignorance," this Article calls on American women
to expose to sunlight, debate and criticism the cultural arguments made
in the context of CEDAW ratification. The Article also points to the need
for criticism and revision of the international human rights framework to
realize process-oriented principles concerning transparency and women's
participation in the making, implementation and interpretation of
international treaties. This Article, therefore, is part of my broader
research agenda criticizing the current structure of international law for
its heavy reliance on traditional notions of the nation-state, which
24. Consider, for example, the fact that the CEDAW Committee recommended that the U.N.
review reservations to CEDAW based on Islam. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Gerald Neuman, Diane
Orentlicher and David Leebron, Human Rights 364 (editors' notes).
25. Sunder, Piercing the Veil, supra note 12, at 1399; see also Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic,
supra note 12, at 307 (discussing the political protests of Iranian and Saudi women opposing their
governments' attempts to deny recognition of women's human rights).
26. See Abu-Lughod, supra note 7, at 785 (critiquing the West's obsession with the veil as a
symbol of the oppression of Muslim women).
27. 1 am not arguing here that Afghanistan guaranties women's human rights more effectively
than the United States, or that mere ratification ensures compliance with international human rights
law. See Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, I I I YALE L.J. 1935 (2002)
(noting that since countries with worse human rights ratings often ratify treaties at higher rates than
those with better ratings, human rights treaty ratification is often associated with worse ratings than
otherwise expected). However, I am suggesting that ratification is one of several variables for
measuring compliance with international human rights standards.
28. For discussion of how the Unites States' hostility to participating in international regimes
reflects American exceptionalism, see MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, AMERICAN EXCEPTiONALISM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (2005).
December 2005]
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operate to exclude women and others who lack power in national law
making processes."
Additionally, by titling this Article "Lifting Our Veil of Ignorance,"
I am alluding to John Rawls's well-known idea of the veil of ignorance."
Using this metaphor in his 1971 book, A Theory of Justice, Rawls invites
us to imagine what principles of justice individuals would choose in
forming a social contract in which no one knows his or her place in
society.' As a thought experiment, we might assume that Rawls's notion
could include ignorance of one's gender (although in 1971, he did not
explicitly list gender as one of the unknowns behind the veil of
ignorance)." A Rawlsian analysis would, thus, posit that in selecting
principles of justice behind such a veil of ignorance, men and women
would choose principles that would be fair and would lead to greater
equality in the sense that in arriving at them, no one is permitted to be
partial to themselves. By extension, this Article assumes that behind the
veil of ignorance, men and women, each unaware of his or her gender,
would be deeply concerned with ensuring women greater equality than is
available under the U.S. constitutional scheme (which, of course, women
were not able to participate in designing).33 This Article suggests, then,
that the principles selected behind a veil of ignorance would be more
consistent with CEDAW than the sex equality paradigm that has
developed through judicial interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.
To be sure, the veil of ignorance is a hypothetical construct, and we
have no actual veil of ignorance in the real world. While we cannot
create a veil of ignorance, identifying ways to broaden participation in
law-making can help us mimic its effects. In securing representation from
as many different walks of life as possible, we could ensure that the
treaty implementation process utilizes principles of process that come as
29. This criticism is developed further in Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional
Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 15o U. PA. L. REV. 245, 251-
52, 255-62 (2001) [hereinafter Powell, Dialogic Federalism]; see also Catherine Powell, The Role of
Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs in the US. "War on Terrorism," 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW
47, 50 (2004) [hereinafter Powell, Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs].
30. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-17 (1971). One may object that Rawls's style of
reasoning is itself culturally located, emerging as it does from Western intellectual thought. However,
since I am drawing on Rawls as a mode of analyzing women's rights in the United States, I am not
proposing imposition of a Western intellectual framework on a non-Western context. I would like to
acknowledge Paul Kahn for raising this point as a possible objection.
31. Id. at 12 ("Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in
society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of
natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.").
32. See Susan Moller Okin, Justice and Gender: An Unfinished Debate, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537,
1548-49 (2004) (suggesting that were gender to be considered a contingent characteristic in the veil of
ignorance-as Rawls later indicated in response to feminist criticism of his work-then "considerable
revision of the theory seemed called for.").
33. Id. at 1549.
[Vol. 57:331
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close as possible to veil of ignorance-produced principles (i.e., principles
that reflect fairness and equality-by including the voices of the
previously excluded, rather than merely the biases of the most powerful
members of society).3 In so doing, broader participation would help lift
the veil of ignorance that surrounds our understanding of CEDAW and
why the United States has yet to ratify it. While Rawls asks us to put on,
rather than take off, the veil, paradoxically, this proposal-which calls
for greater awareness of international law through increased
participation in the treaty process-relies on procedural norms that are
actually consistent with Rawls.35 To the extent that we appreciate that his
principles of justice are principles that require a more fair and equal
process as much as they are substantive principles, a Rawlsian analysis
leads us to both a more inclusive process and the type of substantive
equality envisioned in CEDAW. The primary objective of this Article,
however, is to propose a structural (as opposed to substantive) solution,
by calling for broad-based participation in treaty making and
implementation. 3
Part I examines the emergence of the West/Rest culture clash view
of the world in the human rights field, and warns that this view is both
inaccurate and corrosive. Part II of this Article discusses the value of
identifying cultural objections to CEDAW in the United States, as a
means of moving beyond the West/Rest dichotomy. Part III then
examines the United States as a case study of a Western country whose
failure to ratify CEDAW reflects particular cultural assumptions about
women and their roles in the family and society. By unveiling these
cultural assumptions through examination of the CEDAW ratification
hearing itself, this Article offers a culturally conscious account of the
United States' approach to women's human rights. In developing such an
account, this Article suggests that cultural claims that underlie any
State's objections to women's human rights must be viewed as potentially
contested by and unrepresentative of large numbers of women within a
particular society, given that the views of women are typically
34. Widening the range of participants in the debate about treaties such as CEDAW has the
added benefit of expanding the scope of cultural narratives that we can draw on, leading to a more
complex picture of culture and enriching our understanding of the context in which CEDAW would
operate.
35. Admittedly, Rawls is committed to the notion that reason, not revelation, should have priority
in establishing a system of justice. In fact, the act of stepping behind his veil of ignorance involves
giving up "revelation" as the source of truth. To those who believe that reasoning must start from
revelation, Rawls's position may be a nonstarter. However, by proposing that Americans lift our veil
of ignorance, this Article contends that reason would be facilitated by revealing to more people more
information about "external" international legal norms, the "internal" domestic legal norms, and the
relationship between these two. I would like to thank Paul Kahn for noting the tension that exists
between reason and revelation.
36. Once a more inclusive process is in place, treaties such as CEDAW must either be adopted or
rejected based on their own merits.
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underrepresented in the treaty ratification process. Part IV of the Article
draws on feminist readings of John Rawls's work as a heuristic device to
examine how new, more participatory modes of deliberation over human
rights treaty norms could facilitate the involvement of disenfranchised
groups, such as women, in debates over treaty norms.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CULTURE CLASH
VIEW OF THE WORLD IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD
Conceived of during World War II and in its aftermath, the
contemporary human rights idea insists that all humans everywhere are
inherently entitled to basic rights simply by virtue of our humanity. A
parsing of the human rights idea reveals its organizing principle. Human
rights are conceived of as "human," because they are implied in our
humanity; they are inalienable. Human rights are also conceptualized as
"rights," not mere aspirations or charity.37 Humans are entitled to these
rights equally and in equal measures regardless of location.3
According to the idea of rights, individuals have claims ("rights")
upon society, and society has corresponding duties to provide domestic
laws and institutions to effectuate these rights.39 The duties that States
owe are both negative and affirmative, as they must respect, protect, and
ensure rights. While respecting rights can be achieved through
government restraint from violating rights, protecting and ensuring rights
require more: States must affirmatively provide mechanisms to prevent
and punish rights violators, as well as effectuate rights."
Beautiful in its simplicity, the idea of human rights has become
universal and international.' It is international in that by piercing
national sovereignty, human rights scrutiny has transformed
governments' treatment of individuals, including its own citizens, into an
appropriate subject of international inquiry. The human rights idea is
universal, both as an historical and empirical matter.
Historically, the idea of human rights can be most directly traced to
37. These rights cannot be transferred, waived, forfeited, usurped, or lost through failure to
exercise or assert them. HENKIN, supra note I, at 3.
38. Id. at 2.
39. Louis Henkin, Introduction to THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS I (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) [hereinafter Henkin, THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
RIGHTS].
40. While the distinction between civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social,
and cultural rights on the other is often understood as a re-articulation of the negative/affirmative
rights dichotomy, several theorists have critiqued this dichotomy. See, e.g., HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS:
SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 35-40 (2d ed. 1996). After all, effectuating welfare
rights (typically considered an affirmative or economic right) does not necessarily require greater
affirmative government outlays than the right to liberty (typically considered a negative or civil right),
which requires supporting the cost of a police force, judicial system, and the right to counsel for
indigent defendants. Id. I am grateful to Jeremy Waldron for bringing this point to my attention.
41. HENKIN, supra note I, at 2, 13-29.
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John Locke as well as revolutionary moments in the Western
experience.42  However, these seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
Western ideas of individual autonomy combined with twentieth-century
predominantly non-Western ideas about decolonization, welfare state,
socialism, and group rights.43 This broad conception of the human rights
idea found full expression in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), which was adopted in 1948. As an empirical matter, virtually
all of today's States have accepted the UDHR.4 Even the Asian States
that issued the "Bangkok Declaration" (a counter to the official
document developed leading up to the 1993 Vienna World Conference
on Human Rights) do not seriously take issue with the universality of
rights so much as the selectivity with which civil and political rights are
prioritized over economic, social, and cultural rights.45
These dimensions of the human rights idea are now widely
understood and agreed upon; governments, however, both Western and
non-Western, have failed to respect, implement, and enforce the full
range of human rights. Among other things, this failure is enabled
through selective enforcement, treaty reservations, and the existence of
two separate international human rights covenants that divide civil and
political rights from economic, social, and cultural rights.
While both Western and non-Western States continue to resist rights
compliance, in the context of women's human rights, scholars and
advocates have primarily focused on cultural objections made by non-
Western States. This focus has contributed to the culture clash view of
the world and has coalesced around questions concerning gender
equality.
A. GENDER AS A FOCAL POINT
While far from being the only area where culture creeps into the
human rights field, gender has become an enormous focal point for
scholarship, policy debate and popular discourse on culture. 6 Seyla
42. See id. at 1 (providing historical perspective, including how the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) tracks the American Declaration and French Declaration for the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen).
43- Id.
44. Henkin, THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 39, at I ("The universalization of
human fights is a political fact.... [E]ven those, notably the European Communist states, which had
abstained when the Declaration was approved, have now accepted it formally in the Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation (Helsinki, 1975)."); see also THOMAS FRANCK, THE
EMPOWERED SELF: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM 148 (i999). In tracing the history
from communitarianism to individualism, Franck notes that advocates from non-Western countries
have "taken the lead in insisting that human fights are not a set of imposed western ideas, but are of
universal application, speaking to the human condition," Id. (citing Rosalyn Higgins, Ten Years on the
Human Rights Committee, 6 EUR. H. RTS. L. REV. 570, 575 (1996)).
45. See Powell, Locating Culture, supra note 14, at 207-08.
46. Martha Minow, About Women, About Culture: About Them, About Us, 129 D EDALUS 125
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Benhabib posits that "women and their bodies are the symbolic-cultural
site upon which human societies inscript their moral order."47 Women as
agents for transferring cultural practices from one generation to the next
is hardly inevitable. Yet, the cases advanced in the controversy over
whether human rights are universal or vary according to culture center
on women's bodies" -specifically, non-Western women's bodies.49 For
example, gender segregation enforced by the Taliban leadership in
Afghanistan was seen as a paradigmatic example of cultural defiance
against a human rights framework assumed to be Western." By contrast,
the United States' failure to ratify CEDAW is not seen as cultural, and is
therefore normalized and rationalized.' Why is this so, and does this help
explain why gender equality practices in the United States are rarely
scrutinized as international human rights violations?
B. GOOD ACTORS AND BAD ACTORS
The culture clash view of human rights helps to cast Western States
as "good" actors and non-Western States as "bad" actors. This
West/Rest dichotomy is reinforced by what governments themselves say.
On the one hand, non-Western States are more likely to attach
conditions-known as reservations, understandings, and declarations
(RUDs)-that explicitly rely on cultural and religious grounds, than on
constitutional provisions.52 These States often invoke "sovereignty" as a
(2ooo). Other areas where cultural constructs have been used to describe a clash in the application or
interpretation of human rights include children's rights and the death penalty. On children's rights,
see, e.g., id. (noting that while culture wars focus on women, they might just as easily focus on
children). On the death penalty, see, e.g., Roger Cohen, Tiffs Over Bananas and Child Custody, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 2000, § 4, at 41 (discussing European criticism of U.S. death penalty practices as a
culture clash).
47. SEYLA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE GLOBAL ERA 83-
84 (2002).
48. Cf. Minow, supra note 46.
49. See supra text accompanying note 14-15.
50. See, e.g., Juan Cole, The Taliban, Women and the Hegelian Private Sphere, 70 Soc. RES. 771
(2003). Cole notes:
The Taliban project was tinged with medieval romanticism, in which supposedly traditional
practices were exalted over the West of independent women like Monica Lewinsky and
Kate Winslet. It was above all, however, a form of countermodernity. It envisaged itself as a
pure form of Islam.... As a nativist countermodernity it rejected both major foreign forms
of cultural imperialism, Marxism and liberalism. It represented itself as... authentically
Afghan ....
Id. at 805. But see Shahin Cole & Juan Cole, Veil of Anxiety Over Women's Rights, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7,
2004, at M2 (suggesting that the Taliban's exclusion of women from schools may not have been
particularly faithful even to Islamic principles, pointing out that "[i]n Afghanistan, the Taliban
excluded women from all education, despite the Islamic principle that all believers must seek
knowledge, on the ground that the injunction used masculine grammar and applied only to males.").
51. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
52. Having surveyed all of the RUDs submitted for CEDAW, I have found that sixteen non-
Western governments rely on religion or culture, including: Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iraq, Kuwait,
Lesotho, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
[Vo1. 57:331
LIFTING OUR VEIL OF IGNORANCE
shield against international criticism of cultural and religious practices.
For example, Liu Huaqui, the head of the Chinese Delegation to the
Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, warned that the West's
human rights priorities were not sufficiently sensitive to Asian values,
culture and sovereignty: "To wantonly accuse another country of abuse
of human rights and impose the human rights criteria of one's own
country or region on other countries or regions are tantamount to
infringement upon the sovereignty of other countries and interference in
the latter's internal affairs. ... " In invoking these objections, these
States often construct culture as static, fixed, untouchable and
unchanging, sometimes for self-serving, patriarchal or nationalistic
reasons. These static constructions of culture often developed and were
consolidated in the context of anticolonial struggles, in which nationalist
discourse relied upon particular images of women. 4 Such images of
women have been vital "in marking the identity of the nation" which is
often constructed through metaphor.5 We know also from Benedict
Anderson's work that culture and community are imagined, often in
response to, in solidarity with, or in opposition to colonialism, trade,
immigration, and other transnational projects. 6
On the other hand, Western States, such as the United States, are
more likely to base their RUDs to CEDAW on concepts inherent in
constitutionalism, than on culture or religion. 7 While the United States
has not yet ratified CEDAW, it has proposed RUDs to the Convention,
and Syria. Five of these governments have also invoked constitutional provisions. These include
Lesotho, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger and Pakistan. Two non-Western states, Thailand and Tunisia,
have relied on constitutional provisions, but not on culture or religion. Article 19 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties allows parties to make reservations to a treaty only if they do not
undermine the "object and purpose" of the treaty. CEDAW has a similar provision, Article 28(2),
which permits reservations only insofar as they are consistent with the "object and purpose" of
CEDAW. See CEDAW, supra note 16, art. 28(2).
53. Liu Huaqui, Speech at the World Human Rights Conference in Vienna (June 1993), quoted in
Michael C. Davis, Human Rights in Asia: China and the Bangkok Declaration, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 215,
226-27 (1996). But see Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Asian Values, NEW REPUBLIC, July 14, 1997, at
34 (criticizing this "clash of civilizations" approach and arguing that it is disingenuous to characterize
such a vast and diverse region as Asia as having a monolithic set of values "that separate the Asians as
a group from people in the rest of the world").
54- See, e.g., NARAYAN, DISLOCATING CULTURES, supra note 14 (describing the reliance of Indian
nationalism on particular images of Indian women in need of rescue from British colonialism).
55. Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, supra note 12, at I 198.
56. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (Verso I99I).
57. To the extent Western states provide a reason for entering an RUD, the basis is more likely to
be grounded in constitutionalism than culture. Three Western countries that have ratified CEDAW
refer specifically to constitutional provisions in entering RUDs to the Convention, including Australia,
Liechtenstein, and Spain. Israel is the only Western state that explicitly invokes religion as the basis of
a reservation (in the context of (i) the appointment of women to serve as judges in religious courts,
and (2) personal status laws binding on various religious communities in Israel). However, as discussed
in Part III, other RUDs, such as the RUDs proposed by the United States, implicitly reflect cultural
and perhaps even religious views.
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invoking the related notions of federalism and limited government. For
example, by invoking the notion of federalism in a proposed "federalism
understanding," the United States has arguably tried to limit the
responsibility of the national government in securing women's rights in
spheres deemed the province of state and local government." By
asserting the notion of limited government, the United States has also
tried to limit the national government's role in securing women's rights
in the marketplace. Proposed reservations to CEDAW's requirements
concerning paid maternity leave and equal remuneration reflect this
effort to limit government regulation of the market in wage and benefit
arrangements that would enhance equality for women. 9
International human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and United Nations agencies fall into a similar trap of dichotomizing
Western and non-Western States vis-A-vis women's human rights. One
need only consider proposals at the U.N. to focus on Islamic reservations
to CEDAW in contrast to other types of reservations, or the focus by
women's divisions of international human rights NGOs on "cultural
practices" in non-Western (but not Western) States that violate women's
58. In a September 6, 2002 report, the Senate Judiciary Committee recommended that the Senate
give its advice and consent to ratification, subject to four reservations, five understandings and two
declarations. Proposed U.S. Reservations, Understandings and Declarations to CEDAW, cited in S.
REP. No. IO7-9, at 6 (2002) [hereinafter Proposed U.S. RUDs to CEDAW. The first understanding,
commonly known as a "federalism understanding," is mirrored in several treaties the United States
has ratified. Id. The proposed "federalism understanding" for CEDAW states:
That the United States understands that this Convention shall be implemented by the
Federal Government to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction over the matters covered
therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments. To the extent that state and local
governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall, as
necessary, take appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of this Convention.
Id. (emphasis added); cf. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Reflections on the Proposed United States Reservations
to CEDAW: Should the Constitution Be an Obstacle to Human Rights?, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727
(1996). This "appropriate measures" language could arguably be understood as limiting the federal
government's obligation to ensure fulfillment of the Convention in areas in which state and local
governments exercise jurisdiction. For discussion of the "take appropriate measures" language as it is
used in CEDAW itself, see infra notes 8o-86 and accompanying text.
59. The proposed reservation to the treaty provision concerning equal remuneration states:
(3) That U.S. law provides strong protections against gender discrimination in the area of
remuneration, including the right to equal pay for equal work in jobs that are substantially
similar. However, the United States does not accept any obligation under this Convention
to enact legislation establishing the doctrine of comparable worth as that term is understood
in U.S. practice.
Proposed U.S. RUDs to CEDAW, supra note 58, at 6. The proposed reservation to the treaty
provision concerning paid maternity leave states:
Current U.S. law contains substantial provisions for maternity leave in many employment
situations but does not require paid maternity leave. Therefore, the United States does not
accept an obligation under Article 11(2)(b) to introduce maternity leave with pay or with
comparable social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or social
allowances.
Id. For discussion of CEDAW's requirements concerning paid maternity leave and equal
remuneration, see infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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human rights!" Of course, the very terms "Western" and "non-Western"
re-inscribe the default assumption that the West is culturally neutral,
while the non-Western (the not Western) is residual. I use the terms
"Western" and "non-Western" as a kind of placeholder from which to
examine and criticize the assumptions that underlie this dichotomy.
The construction of Western States as good actors and non-Western
States as bad actors makes it more difficult for the latter to be co-owners
and co-equals in the human rights project, fueling a cycle of resentment
that is damaging and corrosive for the human rights project. For decades,
Edward Said and Gayatri Spivak have discredited the construction of
non-Western countries as the culturally primitive "Other," which has
permitted the West to define a contrasting identity as rational and
civilized-a device used in the service of colonialism and imperialism.
Paradoxically, non-Western governments play along with the
construction of the West as a cultural default by charging that selective
human rights critiques are Western and a form of cultural imperialism or
colonialism.6 , In this sense, non-Western States embrace their inferior
6o. For discussion of proposals at the U.N., see HENKIN, NEUMAN, ORENTLICHER AND LEEBRON,
supra note 24, at 364 (editors' notes). As regards NGOs, see, e.g., Amnesty International USA,
Turkey: Women Confronting Family Violence, Jun I, 2004, available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/document.do?id=7EEo6CB68D64D8iB802 5 6E 7 500 5 24 CAE;
Amnesty International USA, Pakistan: The Tribal Justice System, Jul 31, 2002, available at
http://www.aninestyusa.org/women/document.do?id=535ioB7F966C8ED78o2 5 6CIAoo34DD8 4 ; Amnesty
International USA, Pakistan: Violence Against Women in the Name of Honour, Sept. 21, 1999,
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/document.do?id=iDF2FAo5Aoi67oiB80256goooo693498;
Amnesty International USA, Pakistan: Honour Killings of Girls and Women, Aug 3 1, 1999, available
at http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/document.do?id=45D3AFB5BC 4 AiAE88o25 69oooo693 297 ; Human
Rights Watch, Honoring the Killers: Justice Denied For "Honor" Crimes In Jordan (2004), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/jordano4o4/.
6L. See EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 3 (Vintage Books 1979) (1978) (explaining how the
creation of "the Orient" in European and American literature, discourse, and imagination has
supported Western global conquest and domination); EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM
lO8-O9 (Vintage Books 1994) (1993); GAYATRI C. SPIVAK, IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL
POLITICS (1988); see also Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture": Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of
Multiculturalism, 96 Colum. L. REV. 1573, I6O2 n.I40 (1996) [hereinafter Volpp, Talking Culture]
("Imperialism has been justified by ideology which posits a fundamental distinction between the West
and the rest of the world, created through perceived geographical and cultural barriers, as well as by
methods used to codify difference among peoples, which chart progress 'from primitive or subject
races,' and finally to 'superior or civilized peoples ....') (citation omitted). Leti Volpp notes:
The idea that nonwhites are more culturally determined can be traced to historical
antecedents in colonialist and imperialist discourse. This discourse contrasted tradition and
modernity in the service of justifying the conquest and subjugation of the colonized.
Colonialism associated tradition with colonized peoples, ancient ritual, despotism, and
barbarity, while connecting modernity to Western progress, democracy and enlightenment.
Volpp, Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior, supra note 8, at 97-98.
62. See Tracy Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
89, 113 (1996) (noting that what is perceived to be a Western feminist agenda has been labeled as
"cultural imperialism" and has therefore been resisted by Muslim governments in the context of the
1996 Fourth United Nations World Conference on Women (held in Beijing, China) and the 1994
United Nations Population Conference (held in Cairo, Egypt)); Sunder, Piercing the Veil, supra note
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status as the supposedly culturally primitive "Other." The result is a
delicate dance whereby non-Western States shield their noncompliance
behind a veil of culture, which further enables Western States to mask
their noncompliance as non-cultural and therefore rational. This puzzling
state of affairs represents the central dilemma of this Article.
This dilemma is all the more stark in the context of women's human
rights. The view that women are repositories and purveyors of cultural
knowledge for future generations prompts passionate calls to stave off
what is seen to be the corrupting influence of external scrutiny. Criticism
of cultural practices or restrictions concerning women continues to
prompt complaints that such scrutiny violates the "sovereignty" of those
countries under examination. Therefore, the notion that women's human
rights are inherently Western and that cultural and religious objections to
these rights are exclusively non-Western creates an especially powerful
dichotomy. On the one hand, this dichotomy undermines the work of
non-Western feminists, who are seen as mere agents of their Western
counterparts, even when the work of non-Western feminists draws on
local or indigenous resources." Consequently, this dichotomy also
weakens the ability of "outside" Western feminists, human rights groups
and governments to legitimately support the work of feminists in non-
Western countries.64 On the other hand, the West/Rest dichotomy shields
the cultural roots of gender inequality in Western States, such as the
United States, from scrutiny by either advocates or foreign governments.
II. WHY USE CULTURE AS A VEHICLE FOR UNDERSTANDING THE
REJECTION OF CEDAW IN POST-SEPTEMBER I I AMERICA?
Unveiling the way gendered cultural stereotypes have informed the
United States' consideration of CEDAW may be a step toward moving
12, at 1426 ("[W]hen... signatory states complained to the United Nations that [CEDAW]
reservations based on religion, culture, and custom violated international human rights law, [the
complaining states] were cowed into silence by charges of religious intolerance and cultural
imperialism."); see also Ann Elizabeth Mayer, A "Benign" Apartheid: How Gender Apartheid Has
Been Rationalized, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & AFF. 237 (2oo) ("[A]ttempts to deter the practice of
reservations in conflict with the object and purpose of CEDAW have met with resistance in the form
of accusations that these were tantamount to Western attacks on Islam and/or the Third World.")
(citations omitted).
63. See Sunder, Piercing the Veil, supra note 12, at 1443-57 (describing the work of Muslim
feminists who draw feminist interpretations of the Koran to advance women's human rights in Islamic
countries).
64. Consider, for example, the Nigerian stoning case, in which Amina Lawal was convicted of
adultery and sentenced to be stoned to death. Her backers in Nigeria asked Western-based women's
human rights groups not to get involved, for fear of possible backlash in Nigeria, where support by
Western feminists would be seen as undercutting the work of local feminists by associating them with
the West. Interview with LaShawn Jefferson, Director, Human Rights Watch/Women's Human Rights
Division. In securing a court ruling overturning her conviction, Ms. Lawal's attorneys emphasized
Islamic law over international human rights law. Somini Sengupta, Facing Death for Adultery, Nigerian
Woman Is Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 20o3 at A3.
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beyond this dichotomy. To move beyond this dilemma, therefore, we
need to theorize a "culturally conscious" account of human rights. What
does it mean to theorize a culturally conscious account? A culturally
conscious account of human rights differs from what Karen Engle has
criticized as a culturally tolerant or sensitive approach to human rights
65
in the sense that the former envisions something different than mere
tolerance or sensitivity. A culturally conscious account would recognize
and remedy the ways in which we see and do not see culture; the ways in
which we alternatively essentialize and ignore it; and the ways in which
human rights discourse constructs culture as overdetermined in some
sites and underdetermined in others. In being more conscious of ways in
which the current discourse elides culture, we may be better equipped to
clearly analyze forces besides culture that undermine human rights.
However, doing so requires an understanding that all cultures (including
our own) are patriarchal -"not more or less so, but differently
patriarchal. "66
On a theoretical and practical level, a culturally conscious account of
human rights involves challenging the twin assumptions that (I)
"cultural" objections to human rights are an exclusively non-Western
phenomenon against a culturally neutral Western baseline, and (2)
Western governments are not susceptible to relativist behavior. The
logical corollaries to these twin assumptions are that culture and religion
sit largely outside of the human rights framework,6' and that the only
relativism that threatens universal human rights (and therefore the only
relativism that matters) is cultural relativism, in contrast to other
relativisms that are reflected in selective enforcement of human rights by
Western and non-Western governments alike. This Article tests these
assumptions.
As I have suggested earlier, the cultural clash view of the world
65. Karen Engle, International Human Rights and Feminisms: When Discourses Keep Meeting, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 47 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 2005).
66. Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, supra note 12, at 1217 (emphasis added).
67. In fact, in theory, cultural and religious rights are included in various human rights
instruments. Jeremy Waldron's thoughtful criticism, however, notes that in practice, the human rights
paradigm may be an impoverished framework for evaluating and accommodating these claims. Jeremy
Waldron, How to Argue for a Universalist Claim, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 305 (1999) (arguing
that culture and religious claims represent universalist views that are not adequately reflected in the
human rights framework). This impoverishment further supports my call for a more culturally
conscious account of human rights. At the same time, I am not arguing for a totalizing idea of human
rights that can do all the work needed to address cultural and religious needs and claims. Rather,
human rights provides a framework for mediating what may at times appear to be conflicting claims
(i.e., gender equality and religious rights) and for protecting the space separate and apart from the
state within which individuals enjoy religious freedom, spirituality and culture. HENKIN, supra note i,
at 193 ("[R]eligion [and] traditional societies ... will find, I believe, that their values and goals...
depend on individual dignity and fulfillment, and in a modern world have to be firmly supported by
the idea of human rights.").
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assumes that human rights is a Western construct and that the United
States is generally in compliance with international law norms governing
women's human rights. Since the September i i terrorist attacks, U.S.
foreign policy reflects this view and has used concerns regarding cultural
restrictions on women's human rights in the Muslim World in an
instrumental way to advance the U.S. "War on Terrorism.' ' The use of
women's human rights as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy is aptly
reflected in First Lady Laura Bush's speech regarding the U.S. invasion
of Afghanistan, in which she said that "the fight against terrorism is also
a fight for the rights and dignity of women."'' However, less than a year
following Mrs. Bush's speech and the September i i attacks, the U.S.
Senate considered but failed to garner votes to ratify what has been
called the "International Bill of Rights for Women." Ratification of
CEDAW was defeated in the Senate in part due to pressure by a highly
mobilized opposition that warned that CEDAW is a form of "cultural
colonialism"70 that would force women into work and children into day
care by "eliminat[ing] cultural norms that support the role of the mother
at home[,]" "undermin[ing] the dual-parent married family[,]" 72 and
"go[ing] far beyond the protections already enshrined in the laws of the
United States of America.""
While disagreeing that CEDAW would undermine motherhood or
the family,74 I cannot entirely dismiss these criticisms. In fact, CEDAW
ratification would obligate the United States to make dramatic changes
to ensure women greater equality. Among other things, CEDAW would
obligate the United States to "take all appropriate measures"75 to ensure
68. I use the phrase "War on Terrorism" because the policies undertaken by the Bush
administration in the aftermath of the September i i terrorist attacks are commonly referred to under
this rubric. However, as there is no declared war and the term could have infinite elasticity in its usage
leading to imprecision, I prefer to place it within quotation marks. While the United States has
invoked human rights as a secondary reason to go to war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the "War on
Terrorism" has generally been associated with restricting human rights and civil liberties within the
United States. Powell, Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs, supra note 29, at 47; see also David Cole,
Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002).
69. Abu-Lughod, supra note 7, at 784.
70. Discrimination Against Women: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong.
7 (2002) (statement of Kathryn 0. Balmforth, Former Director, World Family Policy Center, Brigham
Young University) [hereinafter Statement of Balmforth].
71. Patrick F. Fagan, How UN Conventions on Women's and Children's Rights Undermine
Family, Religion, and Sovereignty, HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER, Feb. 5, 2001, at 8,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/IntemationalOrganizations/BG 1407.cfm.
72. Id. at I.
73. 146 CONG. REc. S1276-oi (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2000) (statement of Sen. Helms, titled Radical
Agenda of CEDA W) [hereinafter Statement of Sen. Helms].
74. Indeed, I believe that CEDAW would strengthen both motherhood and families by assisting
women reach their full potential.
75. This phrase, which appears throughout CEDAW, has ambiguous meaning. See infra notes 80-
86 and accompanying text.
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paid maternity leave 6 and may be interpreted as guaranteeing equal pay
for work of comparable worth." These guarantees could offer women far
greater economic security than is available under U.S. law. CEDAW's
prohibition against discrimination also applies to discriminatory impact
as well as discriminatory intent, unlike the Equal Protection Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, which only reaches the latter.7 Moreover, gender-
based violence that disproportionately affects women is included within
the definition of discrimination in CEDAW, unlike the U.S.
constitutional approach.79 Furthermore, CEDAW requires that States
"take all appropriate measures.., to modify or abolish existing laws,
regulations, customs and practices [that] constitute discrimination against
women."' This could reach further into the private sphere than U.S.
constitutional law in eliminating discriminatory conduct.
One possible limitation built into CEDAW is that by requiring
States to "take all appropriate measures," it may create an incentive for
76. CEDAW, supra note 16, art. II(I)(b). While the Family and Medical Leave Act prohibits
employers from firing or replacing those who take parental leave, it does not require paid leave. See 29
U.S.C. § 2612 (2000).
77. Compare CEDAW, supra note 16, art. II(1)(d), with Proposed U.S. RUDs to CEDAW,
supra note 58, at 6 ("The United States does not accept any obligation under this Convention to enact
legislation establishing the doctrine of comparable worth as that term is understood in U.S. practice").
While U.S. courts have not accepted the comparable worth doctrine-the notion that government
should intervene to ensure equal pay for work of comparable value-hundreds of municipalities and
companies in the United States have embraced the comparable worth approach. Mayer, supra note 18,
at 804.
78. By defining discrimination as "any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of
sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the ... exercise by women... of human
rights," CEDAW, supra note 16, art. I (emphasis added), CEDAW would require the United States to
provide a broader equality standard than has been articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause. Compare CEDAW, supra note 16, art. I, with Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (effectively precluding the discriminatory impact standard for equal
protection purposes in the race discrimination context), and Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979) (same as regards to gender).
79. Compare CEDAW, General Recommendation No. x9, para. 6, with United States vs.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). In Morrison, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the civil remedy
under the Violence Against Women Act, finding that Congress had no authority to enact the provision
under either the Equal Protection Clause or Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme
Court did not, however, consider whether Congress had authority under the treaty power, which may
have enabled Congress to enforce the gender equality guarantees in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights -a treaty that has been ratified by the United States. International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 22ooA, U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; see also Catherine MacKinnon,
Disputing Male Sovereignty: on United States v. Morrison, 135 HARv. L. REV. 135, 167-68 (2O0O).
80. CEDAW, supra note 16, art. 2(f).
81. CEDAW applies to the private sphere. CEDAW, supra note 16, art. 2(e) (requiring states
parties to "take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person,
organization or enterprise"). In a proposed reservation to CEDAW, the United States has stated that
it would "not accept any obligation under the Convention to enact legislation or to take any other
action with respect to private conduct except as mandated by the Constitution and laws of the United
States." 140 CONG. REC. S1 3 927-O4 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1994).
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States to use their discretion in determining what is "appropriate" and to
circumscribe implementation of the Convention accordingly. The word
"appropriate," therefore, may provide a loophole for States to limit the
implementation measures they adopt in light of their domestic cultural,
constitutional and other constraints. On this view, States could limit
their implementation of CEDAW's requirements without actually
departing from international law, since the qualifier "appropriate" is
built into the text. In one sense, if CEDAW can be diluted in this way,
this interpretation of CEDAW undercuts the underlying assumptions of
this Article that U.S. ratification of the Convention is important and
desirable. In another sense, however, if CEDAW allows for some
qualification of its obligations due to considerations of
"appropriateness," then my assertion about cultural resistance to
CEDAW in the United States is made stronger. With such a loophole,
the United States cannot justly argue that it is hindered from ratifying
CEDAW by its own constitution, since it need only implement CEDAW
in ways that are "appropriate." On this reading, what appears to be a
loophole actually leaves the United States with no legal leg to stand on,
further exposing the cultural nature of U.S. resistance to ratification (and
the pretextual nature of the constitutional objections)."
In fact, scholars are split on the meaning of the "appropriateness"
language in CEDAW. Some argue it gives States too much discretion.
84
Others contend that the language was intended to strengthen CEDAW
by requiring that States take a broad range of measures beyond just legal
82. I am grateful to Chantal Thomas for raising this point.
83. Indeed, as Malvina Halberstam has observed, the "federalism" understanding proposed by
the United States in its package of RUDs reflects an understanding of the term "appropriate" in that
context as enabling it to implement CEDAW (were it to ratify it) in ways that comport with (i.e., are
appropriate for) the U.S. constitutional framework. Malvina Halberstam, United States Ratification of
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 31 GEo. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & EcON. 49, 58 (1997). As discussed above, by submitting the federalism understanding, the
United States could conceivably limit the national government's responsibility to secure women's
rights in spheres deemed the province of state and local government. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text. Interestingly, Halberstam notes, "The State Department explained at [an earlier
round of ratification] hearings that although the Convention will not be used to 'federalize' matters
that are presently within the regulatory purview of state and local governments, the federal
government will 'ensure that the fundamental requirements of the Convention are respected and
complied with at all levels of government within the United States."' Halberstam, supra, at 58-59
(citation omitted). "Presumably," Halberstam continues, "this means that Congress will not substitute
federal legislation for state regulation on matters presently regulated by state and local governments,
but the United States is not limiting application of the Convention only to those matters that are
presently subject to federal regulation." Id. at 59.
84. See, e.g., Kathryn E. Nelson, Sex Trafficking and Forced Prostitution: Comprehensive New
Legal Approaches, 24 Hous. J. Ir, r'L L. 551, 566 (2002) (arguing that "the Women's Convention has
been largely ineffective" in the area of trafficking because, among other reasons, the "appropriate
measures" language in Article 6 (concerning trafficking) "is not defined and is too vague to be readily
enforceable").
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measures. 8 Yet other scholars take the middle ground, positing that the
"appropriateness" language provides some discretion, albeit limited. 6
Regardless of whether or not CEDAW's text suggests built-in
limitations, clearly some of its opponents in the United States claim the
Convention would be far-reaching in its impact. As discussed in Part III
in greater detail, CEDAW opponents fear that "matters covered by
CEDAW [sic] go to the core of culture, family, and religious belief" and
would destroy "our culture.""8 Indeed CEDAW is not exclusively of "our
culture" (i.e., American culture) nor is it exclusively of any country's
local culture. As with other multilateral treaties, CEDAW is a
transnational cultural artifact that blends a variety of approaches to law
and culture. 88 Understood as an artifact of transnational legality8 and
culture, CEDAW can be seen as a product reflecting aspirations of
women around the globe.' Even so, CEDAW can certainly be critiqued
85. See, e.g., Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women's Human Rights under the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 8 PACE INT'L L. REV. I, 65 (1996)
("Effective implementation of CEDAW necessitates an understanding that 'all appropriate measures'
be interpreted broadly. It should not allow for slow change because of the difficulty in changing
custom, but require intensive education programs to facilitate change, as well as aggressive
enforcement of new laws that are enacted to outlaw these customary practices."). See also, LARS ADAM
REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PRtPARATOIRES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 52, 57 (Kluwer Academic Publishers
1993) (reflecting the fact that representatives of several states involved in the negotiation process
indicated that "all appropriate measures" suggested the use of non-legal or broader than just legal
measures).
86. See, e.g., Andrew Byrnes & Jane Connors, Enforcing the Human Rights of Women: A
Complaints Procedure for the Women's Convention?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 679, 726 (1996) (arguing
that while "it may be argued that States Parties have been left with so much discretion to determine
the means appropriate to eliminate discrimination ... that it is impracticable for an independent quasi-
judicial body to assess.., whether States Parties have complied[,]" nevertheless provisions of the
Convention are enforceable and in many instances justiciable); Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibility
for Violations of Women's Human Rights, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. i25, 161-62 (I994) ("The
determination of what is 'appropriate' must be sensitive to national legal, political and social
environments, but criteria of appropriateness are not within the states' exclusive control....
International human rights tribunals may apply leeway or 'margin of appreciation' in evaluating each
state's program of compliance, but nevertheless hold countries to international standards."); Laboni
Amena Hoq, The Women's Convention and Its Optional Protocol: Empowering Women to Claim Their
Internationally Protected Rights, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 677,715 (2ooI) ("[Wihile obligations to
'take appropriate measures' may be more difficult to monitor than more precisely circumscribed
rights, meaningful scrutiny of a State's performance in implementing its obligations under the
Convention is nevertheless possible.").
87. Statement of Balmforth, supra note 70, at 8.
88. I am grateful to Tracy Higgins for raising this point.
89. Annelise Riles makes a particularly compelling case for the value of analyzing what she calls
"artifacts of transnational legality." Annelise Riles, Wigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the
Era of Information, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221, 277 (1999).
9o. Perhaps more realistically and accurately, CEDAW can be seen as reflecting the aspirations
of treaty negotiators. Treaty makers, like other governmental decision makers, when faced with
specialized issues, turn to the expertise of epistemic communities for advice. See Peter M. Haas,
Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. I, 12-16
(1992). Epistemic communities, while not entirely neutral observers, infuse the treaty-making process
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in terms of both its substantive and procedural requirements. In
analyzing critiques of CEDAW made in the context of the United States'
ratification debates, Part III of this Article attempts to separate
substantive objections (expressed in terms of culture) from structural
objections (expressed in terms of notions of federalism and limited
government bound up with U.S. constitutionalism). At the same time,
the Article explores how these two types of objections may be
interrelated.
In assessing the substantive, cultural objections, this Article relies on
a notion of culture as a way of life that is constantly contested and
redefined.9 To use Bonnie Honig's definition, "culture is a way of life, a
rich and timeworn grammar of human activity, a set of diverse and often
conflicting narratives whereby communal (mis)understanding, roles, and
responsibilities are negotiated."92 In many societies, there is a significant
degree of internal contestation of the meaning of "culture" and of the
interpretation of religious texts, including readings that support women's
human rights.93 With transnational flows of culture, capital, and labor,
local culture is increasingly global and visa versa. The notion that local
culture occupies a completely independent, separate sphere from other
cultures must be rethought in light of the fact that the parameters of local
and global are increasingly intermingled and interdependent.'
Despite this complex reality, reservations to CEDAW based on
cultural and religious objections are sometimes offered as monolithic and
uncontested. In fact, cultural and religious perspectives are likely to be
with expertise that may or may not converge with those of government decision makers. But cf.
Emanuel Adler, The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the
International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control, 46 INT'L ORG. 103, 135 (1992) (describing
the convergence of different schools of thought on arms control in the epistemic community and thus
the development of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence as a "politically viable alternative both to
disarmament and to military superiority"). From the standpoint of democratic accountability, the
influence that experts from these epistemic communities have over treaty negotiations may be
problematic. However, in the arms control context, by having a degree of detachment from the
political process, nuclear deterrence experts were able to avoid the type of interest group capture that
reflects a breakdown in the democratic process. Id.
91. See generally JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY
ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND ART (1988) (examining the fluidity and hybridity of culture); JAMES
CLIFFORD & GEORGE E. MARCUS, WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY: A
SCHOOL OF AMERICAN RESEARCH ADVANCED SEMINAR (t986) (same); George E. MARCUS & MICHAEL
M.J. FISCHER, ANTHROPOLOGY AS CULTURAL CRITQUE: AN EXPERIMENTAL MOMENT IN THE HUMAN
SCIENCE (t986) (same); Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 61, at 1589 (same).
92. Bonnie Honig, My Culture Made Me Do It, in Is MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra
note 4, at 35, 39.
93. See NARAYAN, DISLOCATING CULTURES, supra note 14, at 3-39; Sunder, Piercing the Veil, supra
note 12, at I399; Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495 (2001).
94, BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 17-18 (I996); INDERPAL GREWAL & CAREN
KAPLAN, Introduction to SCATTERED HEGEMONIES: POSTMODERNITY AND TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST
PRACTICES 10-13 (Inderpal Grewal & Caren Kaplan eds., 1994).
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contested within a given society," although male elites-including those
in leadership roles in religious institutions-may claim to represent the
views of others. 6 Moreover, cultural and religious claims supporting
women's human rights can be and have been asserted within the context
of the human rights framework.97 However, scholars have pointed out
that the traditional approach to human rights may be too rigid to fully
realize cultural and religious claims within its framework." Because the
human rights framework provides a floor (not a ceiling) for basic
standards of human decency, the challenge is to determine how it can
best co-exist with other potentially competing aspirations that cannot be
fully expressed through the rights framework,99 so that each human being
can reach his or her fullest potential. Identifying and understanding the
contours of these aspirations-such as those reflected in cultural or
95. See Hope Lewis & Isabelle Gunning, Essay: Cleaning Our Own House: "Exotic" and Familial
Human Rights Violations, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123, 127 n.12, 128 (1998) (discussing how
indigenous African women both support and oppose female circumcision); Sunder, Cultural Dissent,
supra note 93, at 5oo (While individuals are contesting traditional norms and claiming rights to make
new cultural meaning, "law remains steadfastly committed to [an] old-world view of cultural diversity
existing across cultures, but not within them."); Douglas Jehl, Arab Honors Price: A Woman's Blood,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1999, at Ai (citing disagreement within Muslim societies between those who
contend Islam permits family members to kill girls and women suspected of infidelity, premarital sex,
or other allegations of sexual conduct believed to shame the family, and those who contend that such
killings have no basis in the Koran and violate the human rights of women).
96. See Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women's Rights, 12 AM. U.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y I, 2-6 (1997). Azizah al-Hibri argues that while Islamic legal jurisprudence is
primarily created through interpretation of Islamic law by male clerical elites and is often patriarchal
by virtue of this interpretation, the author's own devout Muslim feminist perspective is based on a
reading of the Koran which supports women's equality in many ways; in fact, there is a diversity of
views, even among devout Muslims, on questions concerning human rights issues, such as women's
rights. Id.; see also Amartya Sen, Human rights and Asian Values, NEW REPUBLIC, July 14, 1997, at 34
(constructions of "culture" by government elites do not necessarily represent the "vast variations of
cultural and historical traditions, despite the fact that the conformism that characterizes [the] political
leadership and the official interpretation of Asian values is very powerful").
97. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Canada, Comm. No. 24/1977, U.N. G.A.O.R. Hum. Rts. Comm., 13th
Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/I 3 /D/241977, at 83 (July 30, I98I) (Human Rights Committee case
in which an indigenous Canadian woman successfully challenged her expulsion from her tribe-after
marrying outside the tribe-on the ground that the expulsion violated her right to enjoy her culture in
community with other members of her group in violation of Article 27 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights). See generally Tracy E. Higgins, Regarding Rights: An Essay Honoring
the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv.
225 (1999) (discussing ways in which cultural, feminist and other identity-based critiques of human
rights are often made within the language of rights).
98. Cf Sunder, Piercing the Veil, supra note 12, at 1441-42 (suggesting that "normative, religious
and cultural experience may be so important that it requires more substantive rights within these
spheres than are recognized by formal [human rights] law."); Waldron, supra note 67, at 313-14 (The
human rights discourse must be enriched to include "the variety of cultural and religious and ethical
perspectives that are in the world ... [to avoid] consigning human rights discourse to a rather
unpleasant, obtuse, and morally impervious relativism of its own.").
99. As Louis Henkin perceptively notes, "[r]eligion explains and comforts, tradition supports,
socialism cares, development builds; human rights idea does none of these." HENKIN, supra note I, at
193.
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constitutional claims for example-is helpful in determining how or
whether the human rights paradigm should accommodate them. In
revealing ways in which cultural assumptions operate in a Western
country such as the United States (not merely in non-Western countries,
as is often assumed), this piece argues that "culture" is often
misunderstood as a category for explaining human rights
noncompliance."
III. USING A CULTURALLY CONSCIOUS ACCOUNT TO EXPLAIN THE
FAILURE OF THE UNITED STATES TO RATIFY CEDAW
A culturally conscious account of the 2002 CEDAW ratification
hearings provides a tool for interrogating how traditional cultural
stereotypes of women have been used in the United States to defeat a
major human rights treaty. On the surface, many of these cultural
objections to CEDAW have been framed in terms of principles inherent
in U.S. constitutionalism, specifically the notions of federalism and
limited government. However, invocation of federalism and limited
government obscures the role that cultural stereotypes play in U.S.
resistance to women's human rights.
Over 18o countries are States parties to CEDAW.' °' By not ratifying,
the United States keeps company with Iran and Sudan.I° The United
Nations adopted CEDAW on December I8, 1979, and the Convention
entered into force in September 1981. President Jimmy Carter signed it
in 198o, and submitted it to the Senate for its advice and consent
regarding ratification. 3 Fourteen years later, following years of inaction,
President Bill Clinton made an attempt to secure ratification in 1994. The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 13-5 with one abstention to
recommend treaty passage by the full Senate. But several senators put a
"hold" on it for the duration of the 103rd Congress. Then, in the summer
of 2002, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under Democratic
Senator Joseph Biden's leadership, held ratification hearings on
CEDAW, but there was not sufficient support to carry the required two-
Too. Cf Sen, supra note 96, at 34 (making similar argument in the context of Asia).
IoI. While many states have ratified CEDAW, their adherence to the Convention is very selective.
Among U.N. human rights treaties, CEDAW "has attracted the greatest number of reservations with
the potential to modify or exclude most, if not all, of the terms of the treaty." Belinda Clark, The
Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 281,317 (991).
102. See Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Foreign Relations, Io7th Cong. 8 (June 13, 2002) (Statement
of Harold Hongju Koh, Professor, Yale Law School) [hereinafter Statement of Koh]. In his testimony,
Professor Koh had also mentioned Afghanistan and Syria as non-signatories, but following the fall of
the Taliban, Afghanistan has acceded to CEDAW, as has Syria.
103. The U.S. Constitution gives the President the power, "by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur[.]" U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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thirds of the Senate.
As alluded to earlier, resistance to CEDAW ratification in the
United States has been expressed in two separate, sometimes
interrelated, ways. First, much of the resistance has been substantive,
often expressed as cultural objections to CEDAW. Second, resistance
has also been expressed in structural terms, often articulated as
constitutional objections. While opponents of the treaty have been
upfront about their substantive objections concerning the ways in which
they believe CEDAW would upset traditional culture, gender roles and
family relations, the government's official reservations to CEDAW have
been framed in terms of structural, constitutional objections. However,
these two types of objections can be interrelated. As illustrated by the
testimony and other arguments discussed in this Part, federalism as a
structural or constitutional objection is not only used as a pretext or
distraction from the substantive, cultural arguments. Rather, the notion
of federalism itself has cultural roots and is culturally-coded. The
invocation of federalism as an anti-civil rights, pro-states' rights platform
dates back historically to the days of slavery and, of course, can be traced
through the Civil War and the clashes over desegregation during the
i96os and 1970s. Raising federalism as an objection or reservation to
CEDAW invokes that history as well as the concessions and
compromises made to maintain a balance between federal authority and
state and local power. In this sense, foregrounding federalism asserts a
particular view about localism (and therefore local culture) as a mode for
addressing gender inequality.
The objections made by Republican Senator Jesse Helms against
CEDAW reflect how cultural and constitutional concerns are
interrelated. On International Women's Day in March 2000, Senator
Helms, then chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, explained
his opposition to the Women's Convention, saying, "[I]t is a bad treaty; it
is a terrible treaty negotiated by radical feminists with the intent of
enshrining their radical antifamily agenda into international law."' 4
Complaining that CEDAW would promote "global legalization of
abortion," "[1]egalization of prostitution," and "abolishment of Mother's
Day," Senator Helms concluded:
This treaty is not about opportunities for women. It is about
denigrating motherhood and undermining the family. The treaty is
designed to impose, by international fiat, a radical definition of
"discrimination against women" that goes far beyond the protections
already enshrined in the laws of the United States of America.
0 5
104. Statement of Sen. Helms, supra note 73.
io5. Id. at SI 277.
December 2005]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Putting to one side its accuracy,"6 Senator Helms' statement
illustrates a culturally-specific conception of motherhood and
domesticity as central to women's role in American society. At the same
time, in expressing concern that CEDAW's definition of discrimination is
broader than U.S. law, Helms alludes to the fact the U.S. Supreme
Court's interpretation of the U.S. Constitution offers a more limited
approach to gender equality law than that offered under CEDAW. In
fact, CEDAW would require greater government intervention in the
private sphere and in areas of law traditionally regulated by state and
local governments."°
Brushing aside these cultural and constitutional objections,
Democratic Senator Joseph Biden held ratification hearings on June 13,
2002, when the Democrats briefly regained control of the Senate, and
Biden took over the leadership as chair of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. Echoing Senator Helms' earlier objections, those testifying
against CEDAW during the 2002 hearings also made objections on both
cultural and constitutional grounds. The objections based on culture,
Io6. See Statement of Koh, supra note io2, at 5. Rebutting objections such as the ones made by
Senator Helms, Professor Harold Koh, in testimony supporting CEDAW ratification before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, pointed out that no provision of CEDAW mandates abortion:
To the contrary, on its face, the CEDAW treaty itself is neutral on abortion, allowing
policies in this area to be set by signatory States.... In fact, several countries in which
abortion is illegal-among them Ireland, Rwanda, and Burkina Faso-have ratified
CEDAW.
Id. In fact, the aforementioned countries have ratified CEDAW without reservation regarding the
"family planning" language or making any effort to retain the right to prohibit abortion, indicating no
effort was necessary. Working Group On The Women's Human Rights Treaty, Response to
"Concerned Women For America" at 7 (on file with author). The fact that the references to "family
planning" in Articles 12 and 14 of CEDAW do not imply access to abortion services is tellingly
demonstrated by the fact that the Philippines, another country which prohibits abortion, first
suggested the family planning language that was ultimately adopted. The Philippines also has not
entered any reservations, understandings or declarations concerning the family planning language.
Statement of Koh, supra note 102, at 5.
Of the claim that CEDAW would legalize prostitution, Professor Koh also noted that
"CEDAW's Article 6 specifically states that countries that have ratified CEDAW 'shall take all
appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation
of prostitution in women."' Id. at 6.
Finally, Senator Helms' claim that CEDAW ratification would lead to the abolition of Mother's
Day is also flatly untrue. He had taken out of context a quote from the Committee that oversees
CEDAW. In its concluding comments on Belarus' country report to the Committee, the CEDAW
Committee stated that it was "concerned by the continuing prevalence of sex-role stereotypes, as
exemplified also by the reintroduction of such symbols as a Mothers' Day and a Mothers' Award" as
the only response to the crisis facing women in Belarus - a crisis the country itself acknowledged in
light of the increasing economic challenge facing women there. Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations: Belarus, U.N. Comm. H.R. 22d Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/55/38, paras. 361 (Jan. 17, 2000) available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reports/a5538.pdf (emphasis added); see also Sarah Albert
& Kit Cosby, Working Group On The Women's Human Rights Treaty, Response to Senator Jesse
Helms' Statement on CEDAW at 2 (on file with author) [hereinafter Response to Sen. Helms].
107. See supra notes 76-8I and accompanying text.
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however, were even more explicit.
For example, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Kathryn Balmforth, a treaty opponent, complained that
CEDAW, in requiring equality for women in the workplace, will
threaten U.S. culture and values (as she conceives of them):
These matters, and other matters covered by CEDAW, go to the core
of culture, family, and religious belief.... The doctrinaire approach of
the CEDAW Committee is nothing less than "cultural colonialism,"
which attempts to force a radical western agenda which is widely
rejected even in the West. It completely ignores the right of women
and men, to political, social, and cultural self-determination. log
She went on to argue that CEDAW would undermine the traditional
role of women as mothers who pass on "culture and values."'" To
support this claim, Balmforth testified that the CEDAW Committee
criticized Slovenia because, according to Balmforth, "too many of their
tiniest children-from newborns to the age of three-were with their
mothers, instead of in day care .... A review of the CEDAW
Committee's report on Slovenia reveals that Balmforth's characterization
is disingenuous, and that, in fact, the Committee expressed concern that
children of working mothers lacked formal day care."' Clearly,
Balmforth was willing to distort the facts to advocate for a culturally
conservative approach to gender."' Referring to "our culture" as if U.S.
culture were the monolithic, tradition-bound one that she advocates,
Balmforth contended that women's progress in the United States has
occurred "without an international committee interfering in our domestic
governance and telling us which parts of our culture we had to
jettison.'""' Claiming that international oversight interferes with domestic
io8. Statement of Balmforth, supra note 70, at 8.
I09. Id. at 7.
io. Id. at 5.
i i i. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 86, 104, 114, U.N.
Doc. A/52/38 Rev. 1(997); see also Response to Sen. Helm, supra note io6.
112. Note that the statements of the CEDAW Committee are merely persuasive
recommendations, and are not binding on governments under international law in the way that
CEDAW itself is binding. It is therefore ironic that while some scholars of international law often
deride it as weak, as regards CEDAW, critics claim that the fabric of U.S. culture will be torn apart.
For discussion of the weakness of international law, see, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of
Customary International Law in U.S. Courts Before and After Erie, 26 DENY. J. INT'L & POL'V 807
(t998) ("The great weakness of international human rights law may be the lack of an effective
enforcement mechanism."); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Non-Self-Execution and the
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) (discussing the non-self-executing nature of
treaties).
11 3. Statement of Balmforth, supra note 70, at 5 (emphasis added). In fact, Balmforth's skepticism
of treaties is not limited to the Woman's Convention. Critical also of what she views as anti-family
provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Criminal Court,
Balmforth proclaimed in one speech that the "hijacking of the human rights system by the anti-family
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governance, Balmforth invoked the veil of sovereignty (often raised by
non-Western States) as a shield against international scrutiny of cultural
and religious practices."4 At the same time, Balmforth's complaints also
track the concerns of states' rights proponents who resist interference by
a higher level of government in local governance and culture.
Referring to the "U.N.'s countercultural agenda," in a backgrounder
for the Heritage Foundation, CEDAW opponent Patrick Fagan also
raised explicit cultural objections to CEDAW."' In discussing what he
views as the U.N.'s attempt "to change cultural values and norms,". 6
Fagan warned, "Few Americans are aware that agencies within the
United Nations system are involved in a campaign to undermine the
foundations of society-the two-parent married family, religions that
movement must be rejected by nations and people who value their families and their sovereignty."
Kathryn Balmforth, Hijacking Human Rights, at 5 (Nov. 17, 1999), http://www.newyorkeagleforum.
org/eagle articles/congress%2ospeech.htm. In another article, she claims that the "language of the
International Criminal Court Statute is so vague that, if interpreted by radical prosecutors and judges,
it can be used to imprison religious officials who refused to perform same-sex marriages, or who
preach that abortion is wrong, or who refuse to ordain women." Kathryn Balmforth, UN 1o,
MERIDIAN MAG. (Oct. 15, 2001), http://www.meridianmagazine.com/ideas/ooo6o2unioi.html.
114. I am borrowing and modifying Sunder's use of the phrase "veil of new sovereignty," through
which she criticizes international law for the ways in which, as a system of States, it preserves
traditional notions of cultural and religious authority. See Sunder, Piercing The Veil, supra note 12, at
1458; see also id. at 1409 (criticizing international law for its support of a "New Sovereignty" -"the
increasing use of law to protect and preserve cultural stasis and hierarchy."). I agree with Sunder's
main point that international law protects and reflects traditional claims of culture and religion.
However, international law is also beginning to change in important ways by providing avenues for
individuals to challenge government-condoned practices, including cultural practices. While
traditionally, public international law's focus was almost exclusively on relationships between States,
scholarship on international legal governance observes that human rights law has begun to transform
governments' treatment of individuals into proper subjects of international scrutiny. See HENKIN,
supra note I, at 2, 13-29 (describing how human rights has transformed international law); Harold
Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. i81, 183-84 (996) (positing a theory and
practice of international law as a transnational legal process, which explains how "public and private
actors- nation-states, international organizations, multinational enterprises, nongovernmental
organizations, and private individuals-interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and
international fora to make, interpret, enforce and ultimately, internalize rules of transnational law.");
Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 183, 189-92, 197 (1997)
(describing the growing role of non-state actors in raising human rights law claims in judicial,
legislative, and executive branches); Kofi Annan, The Legitimacy to Intervene: International Action to
Uphold Human Rights Requires a New Understanding of State and Individual Sovereignty, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. io, 2000, available at http://www.proquest.com ("Globali[z]ation and international co-
operation are changing our understanding of state sovereignty; States are now widely understood to be
the servants of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time, individual sovereignty-and by this
I mean the human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in our charter-has been
enhanced ...."). Because avenues for individual participation in the international system are still
fairly limited, however, Sunder's basic point remains valid. I have developed my own critique along
these lines in greater detail in my earlier work. See Powell, Dialogic Federalism, supra note 29, at 251-
52, 255-62.
115. Fagan, supra note 71, at 4. A biographical note for Patrick Fagan in the Backgrounder states
that he was a Fellow in Family and Cultural Issues at The Heritage Foundation. Id.
ii6. Id. at9.
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espouse the primary importance of marriage and traditional sexual
morality, and the legal and social structures that protect these
institutions.... 7 Recycling many of the same unfounded claims that Helms
and Balmforth rely on,"' Fagan also contended that "U.N. statements
denigrate the role of the stay-at-home mother as unfulfilling and
damaging to her own welfare and decry national policies that support
her. The U.N. reports instruct nations to eliminate, through legislation,
cultural norms that support the role of the mother at home.""
9
Pointing out that the CEDAW Committee criticized St. Kitts for
providing inadequate legal protection to children born out of wedlock,
Fagan also argued that the Committee "tell[s] states to normalize out-of-
wedlock birth" and that such "recommendations seek[] to change
cultural values and norms to weaken the standing of the married family
in society ....
Fagan further described what he views as a "clash of cultures .... ' On
one side of the culture clash is what Fagan described as "the benefits of
channeling sexuality and reproduction into marriage [which is] a cultural
norm [that] ensures.., the reduction of violence against women and
children .... the lowest crime rates, greater social cohesiveness, longer
life spans, better health, higher levels of education, and higher levels of
income ..... On the other side of the equation, Fagan claimed:
[T]he U.N. actively promotes sex outside of marriage as an acceptable
cultural norm, and this agenda is made clear in its policies on abortion,
contraception, gender definitions, prostitution, and pornography. The
U.N. encourages governments to lend legal and financial support to the
effort to change long-held and wise cultural norms.'
23
Noting that the CEDAW Committee recommends that countries combat
traditional sex roles and stereotypes through educational campaigns in
schools, the workplace and society at large, Fagan asserted, "The U.N. is
intent on removing the cultural and legal structures that have shepherded
reproduction and the nurturing of children into the married family."'24
Further, Fagan views continuing educational programs, such as those the
I7. I d. at i.
.8. For discussion of these claims and why they are unfounded, see supra notes 106-r4 and
accompanying text.
119. Fagan, supra note 71, at 8.
120. Id. at9.
121. Id. at 17.
122. Id. at 13. But see Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Io7th Cong.
(June 13, 2002) (Statement of Jane E. Smith, Chief Executive Officer, Business and Professional
Women/USA) ("Almost one-third of the American women murdered each year are killed by their
current or former partners, usually a husband.").
123. Fagan, supra note 71.
124. Id. at I6.
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CEDAW Committee recommends for the legal profession and judiciary,
as "part of the effort to change sexual and social norms to promote
unrestricted sexual behaviors."'2 5
Fagan contrasted CEDAW with domestic efforts in the United
States to strengthen families through welfare reform, "parents' rights"
and "traditional social norms. ,,2 6 By contrast, he concluded that "the
United Nations has become the tool of a powerful feminist-socialist
alliance that has worked deliberately to promote a radical restructuring
of society." 2 7
In considering these cultural objections to CEDAW, it is clear that
opponents are uncomfortable with what they view as the treaty's support
for government regulation of and interference with the family
(traditionally defined) and other areas deemed to be "private." In doing
so, these opponents often invoke-either implicitly or explicitly-the
principles of federalism and limited government as a framework within
which to make cultural objections. For example, Balmforth contended,
"CEDAW requires [national] government to intrude in all areas, no
matter how private, consensual, or even sacred.... CEDAW requires
the exertion of government power against family, religion and even
thought. On its face, CEDAW calls for an unprecedentedly intrusive
government."'s
Like Balmforth, conservative commentator Phyllis Schlafly
expresses what are essentially cultural objections (to what she views as
CEDAW's radical approach to family and the role of women in society)
by invoking the notions of federalism and limited government. Invoking
federalism in an article written shortly before the June 2002 CEDAW
ratification hearings, Schlafly asserted that CEDAW's Article i6
(concerning family planning) "levels a broadside attack on states' rights.
It would obligate the federal government to take over all family law,
including marriage, divorce, child custody and property."'29 Schlafly
pointedly wrote, "Private relationships should be none of our
government's business, much less the business of the United Nations.'. 3
Invoking the principle of limited government, Schlafly also rejected
CEDAW's support for government intervention in the market. She
125. Id. at I7.
126. Id. at 19. While welfare reform in the United States was touted as a way to roll back federal
government involvement in providing social safety nets, in fact, by setting national goals (to reduce
out-of-wedlock pregnancies, to increase marriage rates, and to move women off public assistance) the
federal welfare law "flies in the face of the localism that ostensibly animates it." See Michael Dorf &
Charles Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 437 (1998).
127. Fagan, supra note 71, at 21.
128. Statement of Balmforth, supra note 70, at 2.
129. Phyllis Schlafly, UN Treaty on Women, Copley News Service (May 22, 2002),
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/phyllisschlaflylps2002o522.shtml.
130. Id.
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criticized CEDAW's Article 2, which specifies that the treaty applies to
discrimination against women "by any person, organization or
enterprise"-a provision that extends the Convention's protection to
private actors, including corporations, as well as perpetrators of domestic
violence.'3 ' Schlafly was also critical of CEDAW's Article ii, which
ostensibly requires equal pay for work of comparable value (in contrast
to the standard in the United States, which requires equal pay only for
identical work). She complained that the CEDAW provision requires
that "subjective" determinations of equal or comparable value be made
(by the government) in lieu of "objective" determinations made (by the
market). '32
In fact, the U.S. Constitution does authorize Congress to regulate
the private sphere in limited ways to address gender inequality (for
example, through the Commerce Clause). However, by relying on
cultural stereotypes of women as mothers rather than as breadwinners,
CEDAW opponents have been able to provide traction for their claims
that the Convention would undermine U.S. constitutionalism and
sovereignty. In the words of Kathryn Balmforth, "there is no way to
guarantee that the CEDAW Committee will not at least attempt to
meddle in the domestic affairs of the American people, in violation of
our Constitution and our sovereignty."'33 As illustrated through the
words of CEDAW opponents quoted above, the substantive appeal to
culture has fueled the structural, constitutional arguments in support of
government deregulation (through federalism) and market deregulation
(through limited government).
Perhaps anticipating claims that ratification of CEDAW would
threaten American culture and constitutional commitments to federalism
and limited government, senators and non-governmental organizations
supporting treaty ratification during the 2002 ratification debate
packaged it as a foreign policy initiative rather than as an instrument that
would have domestic impact. For example, in an Op Ed supporting
ratification, Democratic Senators Joseph Biden and Barbara Boxer
argued: "Ratification of the treaty would not impose a single new
requirement in our laws-because our Constitution and gender
discrimination laws already comply with treaty requirements. But U.S.
participation could advance the lives of millions of women elsewhere."'34
131. Id.
132. Schlafly, supra note 129 ("Article iI would chain us to the feminist goal that wages should be
paid based on subjective notions of 'equal value' (i.e., the discredited notion of 'comparable worth')
rather than on objective standards of equal work.").
133. See, e.g., Statement of Bahnforth, supra note 70, at I I.
134- See, e.g., Joseph R. Biden, Jr. & Barbara Boxer, Senate Needs to Ratify Treaty for the Rights of
Women, S.F. CHRON., June 13, 2002, at A29. For critique of the inside-the-beltway treaty ratification
strategy that typically, as with CEDAW, downplays the domestic impact of treaties, and in so doing,
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Appealing to the interests of President George W. Bush and First
Lady Laura Bush in "liberating" the women of Afghanistan, Senator
Boxer (whom Senator Biden asked to chair the CEDAW hearings) said,
"[T]he U.S. cannot use CEDAW as a diplomatic tool for human rights
because we have not ratified it-it is very important to the women of
Afghanistan that we do so.""'
A New York Times column by Pulitzer Prize winning writer
Nicholas Kristoff reflects how effective and complete the campaign to
package CEDAW as a foreign policy initiative has been:
[F]rankly, the treaty has almost nothing to do with American women,
who already enjoy the rights the treaty supports-opportunities to run
for political office, to receive an education, to choose one's own
spouse, to hold jobs. Instead it has everything to do with the half of the
globe where to be female is to be persecuted until, often, death.,
6
Referring to critics who "have complained [that] the treaty, in the words
of Jesse Helms, was 'negotiated by radical feminists with the intent of
enshrining their radical anti-family agenda into international law' and is
'a vehicle for imposing abortion on countries that still protect the rights
of the unborn,"' Kristoff states unequivocally:
That's absurd. Twenty years of experience with the treaty in the great
majority of countries shows that it simply helps third-world women
gain their barest human rights.... Do we really want to side with the
Taliban mullahs, who, like Mr. Ashcroft, fretted that the treaty
imposes sexual equality? Or do we dare side with third-world girls who
die because of their gender, more than 2,000 of them today alone? 3 7
Objections concerning the domestic impact of CEDAW have
prompted the United States to propose particular reservations,
understandings, and declarations (RUDs) to limit the domestic impact of
CEDAW. While expressed in terms of constitutionalism (in terms of the
commitment to federalism and limited government), these RUDs can
also be understood in terms of cultural stereotypes and a cultural
approach to women as occupiers of roles that should be negotiated and
determined solely in the private (as opposed to the public) sphere. For
example, in the proposed reservation to CEDAW's Article I I requiring
undermines the relevance and democratic legitimacy of these instruments, see Powell, Dialogic
Federalism, supra note 29.
135. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong. (June 13, 2002) (Opening
Statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer, Member, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations Committee); see also
Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong. (June 13, 2002) (Introductory
Statement of Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations) (explaining that
Afghanistan is reason enough to ratify the treaty).
536. Nicholas D. Kristoff, Editorial, Women's Rights: Why Not?, N.Y. TIMES, June '9, 2002, at
A23.
137. Id.
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equal pay, the United States indicates that it will not accept any
obligation requiring comparable worth that would require government
intervention in the market.' 3s It is fairly clear from the debates
surrounding ratification of CEDAW that there is deep resistance in the
United States to taking on international obligations requiring
government intervention in the market.'39 However, the government
intervenes in the market all the time (i.e., subsidies to farmers, the
bailout of savings & loans, etc.).
So why draw the line at women? Is this line-drawing based on
cultural attitudes regarding women (i.e., women are not typically
breadwinners so why bother paying them living wages)? Or is the market
itself a cultural construct? There is a fairly well-developed literature on
how culture creates capitalism, which can be traced from Max Weber's
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism to more contemporary
legal and economic analyses of how culture explains why capitalism is
failing in Russia, which may help inform this inquiry.'4"
IV. THEORIZING NEW, MORE PARTICIPATORY MODES OF
DELIBERATION OVER TREATY NORMS
As I have noted, non-Western States are more likely to explicitly use
the veil of culture and the orientalist claim that they represent a
culturally primitive "Other," by framing international criticism as a new
form of colonialism. The United States, on the other hand, uses
constitutionalism as a thinly-veiled attempt to block international
scrutiny of the traditional cultural stereotypes of women inherent in U.S.
law and policy. This Article tries to address this paradox by lifting the
veil to examine how the United States masks traditional cultural
assumptions about women that underlie its rejection of the main
international treaty protecting women's human rights. By offering a
138. See Proposed U.S. RUDs to CEDAW, supra note 58; see also Mayer, supra note 18, at 804
(while the reservation rejects the comparable worth doctrine, hundreds of municipalities and
companies have embraced it, undermining the claim that it is anathema to a free market system).
139. See supra notes 131-32 for discussion of Phyllis Schlafly's comments on comparable worth in
the context of CEDAW, and her criticism of CEDAW's Article 2, which applies the Convention's
antidiscrimination protections to private actors. See supra note 1 28 and accompanying text for Kathryn
Balmforth's criticism of CEDAW's application to the private sphere.
140. See, e.g., MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons
trans., Charles Scribner's Sons 1958); Uriel Procaccia, Eternal Russia: The Failure of Contract in an
Icon Society (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2005). But see Chantal Thomas, Critical Race
Theory and Postcolonial Development Theory: Observations on Methodology, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1195,
1218 (2ooo). Thomas offers two critiques of accounts of culture as a causal factor in the development
of economies or societies. First, she observes that "the discourse that developed around culture and
development derived from Northern representations of Southern culture." Id. Second, Thomas notes
that "culture as deployed in this discourse, deflects attention from other factors that might provide at
least an equally compelling explanation of underdevelopment, including inadequacies in the prevailing
economic regime." Id.
December 2005]
HASTINGS LA W JOURNAL
cultural account of U.S. objections to CEDAW, this Article exposes
these cultural stereotypes. These cultural stereotypes-advanced as
American culture -reflect political power of particular groups more than
they reflect American culture. Because culture is not a static concept,
treaty opponents presenting such cultural arguments should not go
unchallenged. The fact that these particular "cultural" claims are
successfully articulated and heard in the context of national treaty
ratification reflects that certain groups are politically organized and wield
political influence, more than it reflects that these claims of culture are
necessarily authentic or representative of the culture as a whole. Indeed,
American culture is so diverse, and cultural attitudes toward women,
family and society are in such flux that it is virtually impossible to
characterize American culture in a monolithic or static way. Opening up
the treaty ratification process could allow these cultural claims to be
scrutinized and debated by the broader public.
New, more participatory modes of deliberation over treaty norms
must be supported in the United States, as well as in other countries, to
ensure that cultural assumptions are scrutinized in broader, more
democratic ways, beyond the narrow group of (typically male) elite
policymakers involved in the treaty-making process at the national level.
Only then can we develop useful ways to evaluate cultural claims and
weigh them against gender equality claims. Whether we ultimately
choose to characterize U.S. objections to CEDAW as being based on
culture or constitutionalism, the influence of a few politically mobilized
groups and individuals-not necessarily the constituents whose rights are
at stake-will continue to shape treaty debates, unless a broader range of
perspectives and experiences are represented.
This Article builds on my earlier work on federalism and human
rights, which criticizes the structure of international law for its primary
reliance on traditional notions of the nation-state.'4 ' By relying primarily
on national governments to make, implement, and articulate
international human rights norms, the international system precludes
popular participation in developing and understanding these norms. For
the most part, national governments only receive input from treaty
"experts" and national organizations. Thus, ratification at the national
level relies on claims that are defined and dominated by national elites.
Women and others who lack power in national lawmaking are often
unable to participate effectively in making, implementing and
articulating international law. One problem is that transparency is
lacking in both international fora (where international law is made) and
in U.S. fora (where treaties are implemented through ratification by the
141. Powell, Dialogic Federalism, supra note 29, at 251-52, 255-62; see also Powell, Transnational
Norm Entrepreneurs, supra note 29, at 50.
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President with the advice and consent of only the Senate-not both
houses of Congress, unlike purely domestic legislation).'42 Thus most
American women do not know what CEDAW is, much less have a voice
in the political debate concerning its ratification by the United States.
Therefore, cultural arguments that paved the way for the defeat of
CEDAW were not exposed to great scrutiny. In my previous work, I
have argued that more participatory avenues of democratic deliberation
are needed in the making, implementation, and articulation of
international human rights law.'43 Whether or not international human
rights standards are ultimately adopted into law in the United States,
Americans should be given an opportunity to debate and consider these
standards in the process of norm creation.'"
Part of my project, then, is to try to understand the role of law-
specifically international human rights law-in the process of policy-
making and norm creation. While traditional legal process approaches
have come under attack, these traditional approaches have given way to
newer legal process approaches that regard the law's legitimacy as based
on not only process but on its normative content as well. 45 This Article
tries to imagine process-oriented norms that facilitate broader-based
participation in the creation of substantive norms regarding human
rights.
This Part is divided into three sections. First, I draw on feminist
readings of John Rawls's veil of ignorance metaphor as a thought
experiment to evaluate the substantive norms in CEDAW. Next, I
identify the need for procedural norms in the treaty implementation
process that would mimic a veil of ignorance-produced rule regarding
gender equality. Of course, we have no actual veil of ignorance to shield
ourselves from knowledge of our gender and other characteristics. Thus,
there is no guarantee that each of us would set aside our self-interests in
debating principles of justice. Even so, broader participation in
ratification debates could neutralize the most powerful self-interests, and
prevent them from dominating the process. The third and final section
turns to an analysis of participatory modes of democratic deliberation
that could expand women's participation in both the formal political
realm as well as in informal sites of political contestation concerning
142. For further criticism on this point, see Powell, Dialogic Federalism, supra note 29, at 251-52.
143. See generally Powell, Dialogic Federalism, supra note 29; Powell, Transnational Norm
Entrepreneurs, supra note 29, at 47.
144. See Powell, Dialogic Federalism, supra note 29, (arguing that while human rights principles
must live or die on the merits, new modes of democratic deliberation must be developed to give
Americans the opportunity to consider these principles, and the freedom to either adopt or reject
them).
145. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 114, at 188 (explaining that this newer school
has a somewhat thicker approach to process insofar as its theorists frontload certain substantive values
such as free speech rights and equality as preconditions of legitimate process).
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treaty implementation. Such modes of deliberation are in fact already
emerging in the context of CEDAW at the subnational level.
In its focus on domestic implementation of CEDAW as an artifact of
transnational legality, this Article attempts to provide a "careful
description of the inner workings of [this] artifact[] ... [as] a means of
understanding how the very apprehension of globalization is created and
intensified through legal instruments. '' I46 This case study is modest in that
it only explores one dimension (i.e., U.S. implementation) of one treaty
(i.e., CEDAW). In examining the interplay of CEDAW's transnational
norms and the United States' cultural and constitutional norms, this case
study recognizes that "[n]either local nor global descriptions of
[transnational legal] artifacts will be adequate since their power lies in
the way they work at multiple levels of scale at once."'47
A. PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE SELECTED BEHIND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE
WOULD SUPPORT CEDAW's SUBSTANTIVE NORMS
In A Theory of Justice,' 4 Rawls asks us to imagine what principles of
justice individuals would choose in forming a social contract in an
original position of equality, in which no one knows his or her place in
society.4 Since behind the veil of ignorance, "[n]o one knows his
situation in society nor his natural assets .... no one is in a position to
tailor principles to his advantage.'... According to Rawls, behind this veil
146. Riles, supra note 89, at 277.
147. Id. at 278.
148. While Rawls's The Law of Peoples is an extension of his domestic theory to the international
context, I find it not to be as helpful as the domestic theory offered in A Theory of Justice for my
present purposes. See generally JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999); RAWLS, supra note 30. First,
my focus on domestic implementation of CEDAW benefits more from the domestic account offered in
A Theory of Justice, which theorizes a process of design for the basic structure of society. Second, in
the international account provided in The Law of Peoples, Rawls draws a line between liberal (as well
as decent hierarchical, and well-ordered, but not yet liberal) societies deserving of respect on the one
hand and the remaining ("outlaw States" or "benevolent absolutisms") not deserving of respect on the
other. RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra, at 4, 63. This line is too sharp for me, and glosses over the
heterogeneity I assume exists within societies and the intermingling I assume exists between societies.
Cf. Martha Nussbaum, Women and the Law of People, I POL. PHIL. & ECON. 283, 287 (2002)
(criticizing what she describes as Rawls's "shop-worn conceptual division of the world into 'Western'
and 'non-Western'... suggesting singleness where in real life there is a complex multiplicity.").
Finally, while A Theory of Justice gives weight to the interests of individuals (and collectives or
associations only insofar as individuals choose to identify with them), The Law of Peoples gives weight
only to the interests of collective peoples (and not to the interests of individual persons). This focus on
peoples again dismisses the diversity I presume flourishes within collective groups of peoples. For a
more elaborate criticism of asymmetries between the domestic case offered in Rawls's earlier book
and the international case offered in the later book, see Thomas W. Pogge, The Incoherence Between
Rawls' Theories of Justice, 72 FORDHAM L. REV 1739 (2004).
149. RAWLS, supra note 30, at 12 ("Among the essential features of this situation is that no one
knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.").
150. Id. at 139.
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of ignorance, men and women in a hypothetical original position of
equality would choose two principles of justice to ensure fairness: (i)
"equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties," and (2) "social
and economic inequalities... are just only if they result in compensating
benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged
members of society."''5' Comparing these principles of justice to
CEDAW, it is apparent that the Convention is more consistent with
Rawls than is the gender equality paradigm that has evolved under U.S.
constitutional law.
As Susan Moller Okin has pointed out, while Rawls's A Theory of
Justice did not explicitly list gender as one of the contingent
characteristics hidden behind the veil of ignorance, in his latter work, he
indicated that gender should be regarded as one of the unknowns.'52
Applying this revised condition to Rawls's A Theory of Justice, Okin
suggests types of gender equality policies that would result mainly from
the principle concerning social and economic inequality. One type of
policy "would encourage men and women to share the public and the
domestic, the paid and the unpaid roles and responsibilities of family life,
equally, so that both might participate on an equal footing in their
various roles-at work, in civil society, and in politics. . . ."' Such
policies could include subsidized child care, flexible working hours for
both parents, parental leave for both parents, and other family leave.'54
These policies are more consistent with CEDAW, which, unlike U.S.
law, requires paid maternity leave and equal pay for work of equal
value.'55
It is not surprising that CEDAW is more consistent with the types of
policies that would predictably result from principles selected behind the
15I. Id. at 14-15.
152. Okin, supra note 32, at 1548 (citing John Rawls, Fairness to Goodness, 84 PHIL. REv. 537
(975)). Nonetheless, Okin takes him to task, because "he gave no indication.., that [adding gender
to the list) required substantial revision of major aspects of his theory." Id. First, Okin argues that
Rawls would have needed to retract or at least explain and justify his assumption that those who select
the principles of justice behind the veil of ignorance were (presumably male) "heads of households."
Id. at 1553. Second, Okin points out that if gender were an unknown in the original position,
individuals selecting the principles behind the veil would "surely be deeply concerned about.., sex
discrimination .d. " I. at 1549. Finally, contrary to Rawls's position that the principles of justice do
not apply directly to the family, Okin argues that in including ignorance of gender behind the veil,
"families would certainly have to be taken seriously as part of the basic structure of society." Id.
153. Id. at 1554.
154. Id. Okin goes on to explain a second type of policy, which is worth mentioning (though it is
less relevant to consideration of CEDAW). The second type of policy would "protect those (perhaps
mostly, but not exclusively, women) who choose to undertake the bulk of unpaid family work, from
the vulnerabilities they now incur." Id. Such policies could include "equal division of the earner's
paycheck between the earning and the non-earning spouse," and family law protection following
divorce to ensure that the non-earning spouse would have the same standard of living as the earning
spouse. Id.
155. CEDAW, supra note 16, art. I i(2)(b) (paid maternity leave), art. i I (i)(d) (equal pay).
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veil of ignorance, since the assumptions built into the Rawlsian construct
ensure a more transnational outcome. Rawls assumes that in selecting
principles of justice behind the veil, "the parties do not know the
particular circumstances of their own society" such as "its economic or
political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able
to achieve."' 6 Just as no one is in a position, behind the veil, to tailor
principles of justice to one's individual advantage, so too no one can
conform these principles to one's societal political, economic, cultural or
other advantages. Instead, the principles would reflect a transnational
sensibility. As an artifact of transnational legality and culture, CEDAW
too reflects this hybridity. It is attentive to and blends a variety of
cultural approaches to law, including elements from the negative rights
paradigm found in the United States as well as from positive rights
schemes, such as those found in places as diverse as Western Europe,
South Africa and India.'
It is important to note here, however, that some of CEDAW's
provisions are expressly designed to overcome a past history of
subordination of women. Such provisions-which permit or even require
affirmative measures to redress a past history of subordination-only
make sense in light of and in response to such a history. Because such
affirmative measures are developed to fit the history and circumstances
of a particular society, they likely would have no place in the principles
adopted behind the Rawlsian veil.
I
,8
B. THE NEED FOR PROCEDURAL NORMS THAT WOULD MIMIC VEIL OF
IGNORANCE-PRODUCED PRINCIPLES
Of course, the veil of ignorance is a hypothetical construct. In the
real world, we have no way of creating an actual veil of ignorance that
would prevent self-dealing in selecting principles of justice. We have no
way to shield ourselves from knowledge of our gender, our particular
cultural values, or other characteristics that shape our place in society.
Moreover, "[f]eminist theory suggests that we can [unselfishly] achieve
identity of interest on the real-life side of the veil."'59 By applying
feminist methodology, we can identify methods in which "people would
not be moved solely by self-interest, but also by feelings of love,
intimacy, and care for others." '6° In this way, we can find other
156. RAWLS, supra note 3o, at 137.
157. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merrit, Affirmative Action-An International
Human Rights Dialogue, THE RECORD, May/June 1999, at 275, 279-310 (Benjamin Cardozo Lecture,
Association of The City of The Bar of New York).
158. Thanks to Laurence Heifer for this valuable point.
159. Mar J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist
Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REv. 613, 627 (1986) [hereinafter Matsuda, A Feminist
Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice].
16o. Id.
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mechanisms to ensure that the norms selected as guiding principles of
justice for society mimic the effect of the veil of ignorance, without
actually needing to privilege abstraction and ignorance of one's
circumstances over the experiential knowledge of one's life
circumstances, which feminist theory has celebrated. 1
By identifying new modes of democratic deliberation in the treaty
implementation process that ensure representation from as many
different walks of life as possible, for example, we can come as close as
possible to selecting veil of ignorance-produced principles (i.e., principles
that reflect fairness and equality, rather than merely the interests of the
most powerful members of society). By securing broader input, new
treaty implementation mechanisms could permit inclusion of the
experience and wisdom of disenfranchised members of the community
along with the already included views of more powerful members. While
not ridding ourselves of the problem of self-dealing that the Rawlsian
model seeks to eliminate, the more inclusive approach envisioned here
builds a case for more dialogue and negotiation over what interests,
values and norms should be advanced through the treaty ratification
process. By being more participatory, such an approach would, thus, be
more likely to reflect basic fairness and equality of the sort Rawls
envisioned."'
i. The Treaty Reservation Approach
The models that exist within the international system for
consideration of cultural difference are flawed in that they fail to permit
a wider range of experience to inform the process for articulating and
weighing culture, gender and other claims. Currently, we have a system
of treaty reservations that provides an escape valve for cultural
difference. Using treaty reservations as a way to accommodate cultural
differences is an imperfect solution. Because reservations undermine
human rights compliance by making noncompliance legal and shutting
off individuals from accessing their full spectrum of rights, the hurdle for
States to make reservations should be high. While States ostensibly make
reservations to certain rights (i.e., sex equality) by asserting other rights
(i.e., cultural and religious claims), this approach locates national
governments as the site where culture is defined and articulated. This, of
course, allows these governments to manipulate how they choose to
characterize their culture to meet various political ends, even when they
are inconsistent with human rights. Because culture is continuously
i6i. Id. at 619.
162. Of course, there are reasons to be cautious in claiming that greater participation (and
specifically greater inclusion of women) would translate into adoption of legal norms that reflect
fairness and equality. One source of skepticism about this claim is explored infra notes 169-72 and
accompanying text.
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defined and redefined through dynamic processes that occur within and
between societies, it is almost impossible for a State to refer to any
particular "culture" as if it relates to a pure, unadulterated, or monolithic
"tradition" of an imagined past.' 63 The requirement in international law
that treaty reservations may not be inconsistent with the "object and
purpose" of the treaty fails to account for the plasticity of culture and the
incentives that exist for States to manipulate this plasticity.1
64
2. The European Margin of Appreciation Approach
Another approach is the European margin of appreciation approach.
This doctrine assumes that there is a set of universal European norms,
from which individual European States can deviate by a particular
margin, to allow for some degree of diversity among States in their
approaches to human rights. This model for accommodating culture is
flawed because it assumes a layer of sameness, upon which a layer of
difference is built. As with the treaty reservations approach, the margin
of appreciation idea provides an inadequate vehicle for accommodating
difference because, again, it locates States as the primary site for
negotiating culture and other claims.
Instead, we need more participatory, democratic modes of
deliberation over international human rights treaty norms.
Encompassing a wider range of participants than are typically involved in
the national treaty ratification process, such alternative avenues of
deliberation would expose cultural and constitutional objections to
human rights to broader scrutiny. How can we reconceive existing
avenues of deliberation over treaty norms to develop more participatory,
more democratic approaches?
C. EXPANDING WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN BOTH INFORMAL AND FORMAL
SITES OF DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION
This Article makes two proposals that would support new modes of
deliberation over human rights treaties. The first proposal is to broaden
the involvement of women in the implementation of treaty norms by
expanding the "sites of democratic contestation" beyond the formal
political realm. 6, "[R]ather than locating the source of democratic
163. As Benedict Anderson has pointed out, ideas and representations of culture often emerge
from an imagined past. Benedict Anderson, supra note 56. As Anderson and others suggest, culture is
not fixed or static. Rather, "culture [i]s composed of seriously contested codes and representations."
James Clifford, Introduction: Partial Truths, in WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF
ETHNOGRAPHY 1, 2 (James Clifford & George E. Marcus eds., 1986).
164. As mentioned earlier, Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note
52, allows parties to make reservations to a treaty if they do not undermine the "object and purpose"
of the treaty. CEDAW has a similar provision, Article 28(2), which permits reservations if they are
consistent with the "object and purpose" of CEDAW. CEDAW, supra note 16, art. 28(2).
165. Susan Moller Okin, Multiculturalism and Feminism: No Simple Question, No Simple Answers,
in MINORITIES WITHIN MINORITIES: EQUALITY, RIGHTS AND DIVERSITY 67, 8o (Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff
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legitimacy strictly in formal political deliberation," we should recognize
that "the scope of democratic activity is much wider than this .... ,"66
After all, "nonformal democratic resistance and reinvention in the
private realm also speak to the issue of a [norm's] legitimacy or
illegitimacy.' ', 6 While these informal avenues of political deliberation
and expression may operate in opposition to government policy, such
modes of deliberation may ultimately strengthen the democratic
legitimacy of law by offering greater transparency and participation in
the creation and reformation of law. In reinvisioning the traditional
process for considering human rights treaties, this proposal calls for an
attentiveness to methodologies for community education and decision-
making that increase critical engagement by community members with
both international norms as well as domestic cultural or constitutional
claims opposing these norms.68
The second proposal is to broaden the involvement of women in
formal sites of deliberation by supporting the emergence of state and
local CEDAW initiatives. These state and local initiatives provide
laboratories of experimentation that further support critical engagement
by community members with both international norms and domestic
claims opposing these norms. Because the size of the relevant community
is smaller at the state and local level than at the national level,
community participation in deliberation over these "external"
international norms and "internal" domestic claims is more workable.
Why expand women's participation in deliberations over human
rights treaty norms, when the majority of those who testified in the 2002
CEDAW national ratification hearings were women? Indeed, as
discussed in Part III of this Article, many of the main opponents who
testified or spoke out against CEDAW during the 2002 ratification
debate were women, including Phyllis Schlafly and Katherine Balmforth.
There is a rich literature emphasizing the importance of crediting the
account women offer of their own experiences and entitling women to
describe and define these experiences. 69 At the same time, despite the
important emphasis of these "standpoint epistemologists" on the
significance of "women's stories as understood by women themselves,
the problem of untangling the connection between the oppression of
Spinner-Halev eds., 2005) [hereinafter Okin, No Simple Question] (quoting Monique Deveaux, A
Deliberative Approach to Conflicts of Culture, in MINORMES WITHIN MINORMES, supra, at 340,341).
166. Monique Deveaux, A Deliberative Approach to Conflicts of Culture, 31 POL. THEORY 780, 781
(2003).
167. Id.
168. Cf. Sunder, Piercing the Veil, supra note 12, at 1443-57 (describing similar critical engagement
through the work of Women Living Under Muslim Laws).
169. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1763 (i990); Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
Jurisprudential Method, I I WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 7 (1989).
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women and their own definition of their condition persists.""'7 After all,
the possibility of "internalized oppression and the process of
consciousness-raising [through self-examination and sharing of
experiences] both imply that every woman's report of her own condition
may not be fully credited as a reliable guide to her own flourishing."''7 I By
creating opportunities for inclusive problem solving and bottom-up
innovation,'72 broader, more inclusive modes of implementing human
rights treaties would permit women to accept or reject CEDAW norms
based on a fuller understanding of what the Convention offers, rather
than allow cultural objections to defeat the Convention before women
across the country even have a chance to learn about CEDAW.
Theorizing from the facts on the ground,'73 the remainder of this
Article looks to emergent modes of deliberation that have led to (i) "the
expansion of sites of democratic contestation" outside the formal
political realm, and (2) "the inclusion of women in formal decision-
making processes.""
i. Expansion of Women's Participation Outside the Formal
Political Realm
As Monique Deveaux reminds us in her "deliberative approach" to
negotiating intracultural conflicts, "[d]emocratic activity is not exhausted
by formal political processes; it is also reflected in acts of cultural dissent,
subversion, and reinvention in a range of social settings."'75 Such
"[i]nchoate democratic activity" may be found in "homes, schools,....
religious [institutions,] ... and in the provision of community and social
services .... ,,"176 With an "expanded view of the scope of democratic
activity comes an expanded view of the basis for democratic
legitimacy."'77
In considering the value of informal political deliberation over
human rights treaty norms, we can usefully consider feminist legal
methods here. As Katherine Bartlett notes in her pioneering work on
170. Higgins, supra note 62, at Ii8.
171. Id. at II9 (citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 83-
105 (1989) (discussing the role of consciousness-raising in feminist method)).
172. See Susan Sturm, New Governance and the Architecture of Learning, Mobilization, and
Accountability: Lessons from Gender Equity Regimes, in NEW GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
EUROPE AND THE US 4 (Grainne De Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (describing "features central to
new governance approaches, including self study, participatory problem solving, experimentation,
benchmarking, and centralized bodies providing pooling and assessment of bottom-up innovation").
173. This approach draws inspiration from the work of other scholars who are exploring and
developing theories of governance in a variety of fields by looking to developments in practice and
theorizing based on these real-life developments. See, e.g., the work of Jennifer Gordon, James
Lieberman, Charles Sable, William Sage, and Susan Sturm.
174. Okin, No Simple Question, supra note 165, at t8 (internal citation omitted).
175. Deveaux, supra note i66, at 782.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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feminist legal methods, such methodologies "reflect the status of women
as 'outsiders,' who need ways of challenging and undermining dominant
legal conventions and of developing alternative conventions which take
better account of women's experiences and needs."'' 8 One such
methodology that would engender community deliberation over human
rights norms is consciousness-raising, which Bartlett describes as the
process of "seeking insights and enhanced perspectives through
collaborative or interactive engagements with others based upon
personal experience and narrative. ...""' Because conventional
understandings of truth disguised as neutral in fact reflect male points of
view, consciousness-raising is a critical tool women use to reflect upon
and describe their own experiences and truths."'°
Consciousness-raising operates as feminist method not only in small
personal growth groups, but also on a more public, institutional level,
through "bearing witness to evidence[] of patriarchy as [it] occur[s],
through unremitting dialogues.., and challenges to the patriarchs, and
through the popular media, the arts, politics, lobbying, and evenlitigation." '' s
As discussed in fuller detail below, the benefit of consciousness-
raising is that it can involve critical engagement with the "external"
norms that international human rights law offers as well as with the
"internal" norms of U.S. law, particularly as it is expressed through
cultural and constitutional objections to international human rights
treaty provisions. However, there are possible drawbacks to
consciousness-raising -particularly where differences such as race, class,
sexuality, and other vectors of inequality exist. To avoid these
drawbacks, "[t]he task of feminist method is to listen openly to those
women who are different .... especially the most subordinated-to hear
their stories as best we can and to check our theories against the interests
of those we have listened to.'',8  Moreover, "we must be slow to
generalize, slow to build grand theory-or at least willing to revise our
theories continuously in light of new knowledge."'' 3
178. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829,831 (1990).
179. Id. Bartlett offers two other closely related feminist methodologies: "(i) identifying and
challenging those elements of existing legal doctrine that leave out or disadvantage women and
members of other excluded groups (asking the "woman question") [and] (2) reasoning from an ideal
in which legal resolutions are pragmatic responses to concrete dilemmas rather than static choices
between opposing, often mismatched perspectives (feminist practical reasoning) ...." Id.
18o. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory,
7 SIGNS 515, 537 (L982); Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, I DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 6 n.28
(1994).
18I. Bartlett, supra note 178, at 864-65 (quoting Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist
Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 9-so (1988)).
182. Patricia A. Cain, Stories from the Gender Garden: Transsexuals and Anti-Discrimination Law,
75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1321, 1327 (1998).
183. Id.
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Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play a key role in
providing a forum for consciousness-raising as a method of community
deliberation. In his work, John Rawls discusses the role of associations in
cultivating and sustaining a just society. For my purposes, in focusing on
"associations," I am referring to nongovernmental institutions in civil
society, which include cultural and religious institutions as well as
advocacy organizations and other types of NGOs' 4 For Rawls,
associations play an important role in sustaining a commitment to the
principles of justice once the veil of ignorance is lifted. Rawls recognized
that a just society would not be easy to maintain, since once the veil of
ignorance is lifted, people may "realize that they could benefit from a
less egalitarian social distribution [and abandon] the principles of justice
they [chose] in the original position, when their impartiality was
assured."'8 5 To increase stability of the just society and to promote moral
learning, Rawls posits that members of society "grow up under a
framework of reasonable and just political and social institutions."'M This
process of moral learning enables "a sense of justice as they grow up. '87
This sense of justice acquired by citizens "inclines them not only to
accept but to act upon the principles of justice. ' '88
Because we must choose principles of justice and policies that
express these principles on the "real-life side of the veil," '89 for my
purposes, nongovernmental associations play an important role not only
in sustaining these principles and policies, but also in creating them. By
providing a variety of avenues for deliberation and advocacy, NGOs
broaden and facilitate the involvement of community members from a
variety of backgrounds and experiences in communal decision-making
over these principles and policies. To the extent these associations play a
role in affecting public policy, they help to ensure greater representation
and engagement in policy from a broad and diverse range of voices. By
increasing the range of perspectives in deliberations over public policy,
this broadened participation from community members produces veil of
ignorance-like principles and policies that are more fair and
representative. Applying this vision of NGOs to the context of domestic
implementation of international human rights law, it is clear that these
associations hold tremendous potential.'" In facilitating consciousness-
184. I am borrowing this definition from McClain, The Place of Associations, supra note 20, at
1570.
185. Okin, supra note 32, at 1542; see also RAWLS, supra note 30, at Part 11I.
i86. RAwLs, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note L48, at 7.
187. Id. at 44.
188. Id. at 45.
189. Matsuda, A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, supra note I59, at 627.
19o. Indeed, NGOs have emerged as norm entrepreneurs that fill gaps where traditional avenues
of policy-making have failed. Cf Powell, Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs, supra note 29 (discussing
the role of NGOs in initiating conversation about human rights in the debate over the trade-off
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raising and other forms of community deliberation, these NGOs create
and sustain principles and policies in the context of human rights through
three functions: (a) critical learning and engagement, (b) political action
and institutional change, and (c) transnational networking.
a. Critical Learning and Engagement
First, NGOs offer opportunities to learn critically about
international human rights norms by using popular education training as
a form of community deliberation. Rather than merely convey
information, such training sessions offer an opportunity for community
members to critically engage human rights norms and evaluate them
against the backdrop of cultural and constitutional norms claimed on
behalf of the community in opposition to human rights. Through this
critical engagement, community members remake and translate
international human rights law to fit their local circumstances.' 9' At the
same time, this process also involves re-examination of the cultural and
constitutional objections to rights, and may reveal these claimed "truths"
to be socially constructed, historically contingent, and biased.
Describing similar critical engagement through the work of the
NGO, Women Living under Muslim Laws (WLUML), Madhavi Sunder
observes that by "[r]evealing [asserted] truths as partial, women are
empowered to reconstruct religious and cultural norms in ways that
reflect modern, international human rights principles and women's own
current needs and aspirations.' 9. In her study of WLUML, Sunder
describes how the group encourages its members to deliberate over the
meaning and relevance of international human rights standards for
women through use of an interactive human rights training manual,
Claiming Our Rights: A Manual For Women's Human Rights Education
in Muslim Societies.'93 By using role playing, fact patterns, and exercises
in the manual, WLUML facilitates critical engagement with the religious
and cultural traditions of their communities as well as with the
between national security and civil liberties in the U.S. "War on Terrorism").
I9i. For a discussion of the importance of translation rather than mere transmission of
international human rights law from the international to the domestic context, see Karen Knop, Here
and There: International Law and Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 501, 504-05 (2000)
(arguing that genuine domestic incorporation of international law involves more than "a conveyor belt
that delivers international law to the people"); Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 114, at
184, I86 (describing interactions between the domestic and international as an iterative process that
generates new understandings of law); Powell, Dialogic Federalism, supra note 29, at 251 (arguing that
the translation metaphor is particularly well-suited to the U.S. context because it describes the
foreignness that many Americans associate with international law); Sunder, Piercing the Veil, supra
note 12, at 1444 (describing translation as a core empowerment strategy used by feminists in Muslim
countries where women are reconceiving human rights in ways that are relevant to their particular
local religious and cultural contexts).
192. Sunder, Piercing the Veil, supra note 12, at 1443.
193. Id. at 1443-57.
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international human rights norms themselves.'94
b. Political Action and Institutional Change
A second way in which NGOs create and sustain principles of justice
and policies to advance these principles is by providing a vehicle for
political action and institutional change. Once the community has
engaged in a process of critical engagement, community members are
poised to develop strategies to change public policy. As is discussed in
further detail below, this could involve advocacy for federal, state and/or
local adoption of CEDAW. Linda McClain notes that in shaping the
"background culture of civil society,"' 95 nongovernmental associations
"contribute[] to liberal democracy by affording oppositional space to
'enclaves of protected discourse and action' which allow social actors to
seek to correct the injustices of an ongoing democracy by bringing about
social change."' 6 McClain reflects on the fact that several feminist
scholars have examined the work of local women's organizations as
"deliberative enclaves of resistance.' 97 As with Madhavi Sunder's work
described above, the women's associations examined in this scholarship
often assert women's human rights norms within their religious or
cultural contexts, rather than in opposition to them (in contrast to the
approach described in the culture clash scholarship).
In addition to examining how local women's groups can "generate
new understandings of the requirements of justice"' by reinterpreting
religious texts and cultural norms in ways that support gender equality,
these scholars have documented how these associations act upon these
new understandings. For example, in her work challenging cultural
assumptions of women in India and its diaspora, Uma Narayan
underscores the role of associations in realizing the transformative
potential of women making political connections to other women."
Narayan makes the distinction between, on the one hand, women's
awareness of their "personal problems" (i.e., gender dynamics within
their families) and, on the other, their recognition of these problems "as
a systematic part of the ways in which their family, their 'culture,' and
changing material and social conditions script gender roles and women's
lives, [which] they must contest.., in more formal, public, and political
ways."2" Thus, "[i]t takes political connections to other women....
194. Id.
195. McClain, The Place of Associations, supra note 2o, at 1572 (quoting John Rawls, The Idea of
Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 774-75 & nn.28, 30 (1997)).
196. Id. at 1586 (quoting Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions For Civil Society-
Revivalists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301,321-22 (2000)).
197. Id. at 1592 (citation omitted).
198. Id. at 1593 (citation omitted).
199. NARAYAN, DISLOCATING CULTURES, supra note 14, at I I.
200. Id.
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political analyses of women's problems," deliberation, and opportunities
to strategize and develop solutions "to make women into feminists in any
full-blooded sense."'. Similarly, Celestine Nyamu alludes to the potential
of associations as deliberative sites for "Third World" women to
participate in shaping community norms and values." ' She insists that
women and women's associations should be consulted when courts and
legislators are determining what notion of culture or religion should
inform an opinion or statute. 3
c. Transnational Networking
A third way in which NGOs create and sustain principles of justice
and related policies in the context of human rights is through the
formation of transnational networks. These transnational advocacy
networks permit domestic NGOs to create alliances with similarly-
situated foreign NGOs (as well as foreign governments, scholars and
international organizations) to mobilize and place pressure on domestic
decision-making bodies. 4 In my earlier work, I have explored how
NGOs emerged as transnational norm entrepreneurs and have benefited
from their involvement in transnational networks in mobilizing
opposition to the U.S. policy of incommunicado indefinite detention of
terrorism suspects at the U.S. naval base in Guantdtnamo Bay, Cuba. 5 In
the context of domestic implementation of human rights within the
continental United States, NGOs have also begun to use transnational
communication structures and information strategically to challenge
human rights violations in the United States on issues such as the
juvenile death penalty."'
As Harold Koh has observed, these transnational norm
entrepreneurs not only mobilize popular opinion and political support
within their host country and abroad, they also play an important role in
"'elevating their objective beyond its identification with the national
interests of their government."' Thus, in the context of CEDAW,
201. Id.
202. See Celestine 1. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural
Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 381, 393-95 (2000).
203. See id. at 409-17.
204. See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voices in an Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV.
167, 169 (999).
205. Powell, Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs, supra note 29, at 49-52, 71-77. This work draws
on Harold Koh's use of the term "transnational norm entrepreneurs." See Harold Hongju Koh, The
1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623, 647 (1998) [hereinafter
Koh, Frankel Lecture] (describing the role of "transnational norm entrepreneurs," which assists States
to internalize norms of the transnational legal process).
206. For example, in striking down the juvenile death penalty, the U.S. Supreme Court cited to an
amicus brief filed by a foreign NGO. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1199 (2005) (citing Brief
for Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 13-14).
207. Koh, Frankel Lecture, supra note 205, at 647 (quoting Ethan A. Nadelmann, Global
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NGOs, working with overseas allies through transnational networks,
could reframe the debate concerning cultural and constitutional
objections raised in opposition to the Convention. For example, during
the CEDAW ratification debates held in the summer of 2002, NGOs
might have secured greater support from feminist organizations in
Muslim countries as a way of showing that the traditional cultural
stereotypes used to oppose CEDAW in the United States are similar to
stereotypes the United States has sought to challenge through its foreign
policy and military operations in the Muslim world.
2. Inclusion of Women in Formal Decision-Making Through
State and Local CEDA W Initiatives
In the United States, thirty-eight cities, sixteen counties, fourteen
states, and the territory of Guam have adopted resolutions calling for the
United States to ratify CEDAW.2° While San Francisco has adopted
CEDAW into local law2" and efforts are underway to do the same in
New York City,10 the resolutions in other cities and states are
nonbinding. Many of these resolutions can be seen as calls for local
implementation as well as national ratification."' In this sense, much of
the state and local CEDAW work is geared toward building momentum
toward national ratification." '
The San Francisco CEDAW Ordinance, which is binding law, can be
seen as a case study of a mechanism that has increased the involvement
of women in the formal law-making process by expanding opportunities
for community deliberation and critical engagement. First, women and
women's rights organizations were at the forefront of securing passage of
the ordinance. In getting the ordinance off the ground, the San
Francisco-based Women's Institute for Leadership Development
(WILD) for Human Rights spearheaded a coalition of local, national and
international nongovernmental organizations."3 Undertaking the process
of both educating community members about CEDAW and gaining
support for its local adoption, the coalition organized monthly
workshops, meetings with policymakers to make the case for the
Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society, 44 INT'L ORG. 479, 482 (i99o)).
2o8. States, Counties, & Cities that have Passed Resolutions on CEDAW, at http://www.us.bahai.org/
externallwomen/cedaw/cedawPassedres.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2005).
209. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE, ch. 12K (2O0O).
21o. New York, N.Y., int. 512-A, Human Rights in Government Operations Audit Law (Human
Rights Goal) (introduced Dec. 7, 2004).
211. Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619,
670 (2001) ("[CEDAW p]roponents' goals are to change local, national and international laws; their
means deploy local actors working in concert with outsiders.").
212. See id. ("To conceive of local action as... indigenous to a particular place is to miss how
often that work is a product of broad efforts to shift social policy.").
213. FORD FOUND., CLOSE TO HOME: CASE STUDIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN THE UNITED STATES
74 (2004).
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ordinance, and a public hearing where the relevance of the ordinance
could be demonstrated through the testimony of women from the local
community as well as government officials."4 Moreover, the San
Francisco Commission on the Status of Women worked closely with the
coalition as a key governmental partner, providing valuable contacts to
City Hall.215
Following passage of the ordinance, a task force composed of both
governmental and nongovernmental representatives was established to
monitor its implementation, pursuant to the ordinance.26 City agencies
develop Action Plans and develop gender analyses to evaluate their
employment practices, budget allocations and delivery of services in
gender terms."7 The effect of the ordinance is to reconceptualize the
domestic antidiscrimination paradigm in human rights terms."' Among
other things, this involves going beyond the negative rights framework of
domestic equality law, by also adopting a positive rights approach and
placing affirmative obligations on government."9 Furthermore, CEDAW
prohibits policies that have a discriminatory effect on women, as well as
those policies that are intentionally discriminatory, whereas only the
latter are prohibited by the U.S. Constitution. " '
In signing the city ordinance, Mayor Willie Brown, Jr. pointed out,
"The United States is the only industrialized country in the world that
has yet to ratify CEDAW ..... Sending a signal to Washington, Mayor
Brown stated, "We want to set an example for the rest of the nation
because it is long overdue .... Following San Francisco's adoption of
CEDAW, dozens of other cities, counties, and states adopted resolutions
calling on the federal government to ratify CEDAW.2 3
In previous work, I have argued that the emergence of such state
and local initiatives represents an important development for the
implementation and enforcement of treaties, in light of the federal
government's failure to ratify or provide broad-based consideration of
CEDAW and other basic human rights treaties. 4 "While the U.S.
Constitution assigns the power to make and adopt treaties to the federal
government, state and local governments have 'adopted' human rights
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 75.
217. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE, ch. 12K, § i2.K. 4 (b).
218. FORD FOUND., supra note 213, at 74,77.
219. See id.
220. CEDAW, supra note 16, art I.
221. Gretchen Sidhu, San Francisco Plunges Ahead in Adopting a CEDAW Treaty of lts Own, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 2, 1998, at 8.
222. Id.
223. See States, Counties, & Cities that have Passed Resolutions on CEDAW, supra note 208.
224. Powell, Dialogic Federalism, supra note 29, at 276-80.
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treaties and other international norms, often in response to constituent
pressures that are more effectively mobilized at the subnational level.. 2.
In fact, in adopting standards from human rights treaties, such as
CEDAW, state and local enactments call for federal ratification, and in
this sense invite dialogue with the federal government. I have called this
arrangement "dialogic federalism"'" 6 and have argued that this dialogue
among various levels of government is critical to meaningful
implementation of international human rights law in the United States."'
Much of the scholarly debate on federalism and international human
rights law in the United States argues in favor of either federal
supremacy (at one end of the spectrum) or states' rights (at the other end
of the spectrum). "These divergent images capture different moments of
political promise and despair, at times focused on the immense power of
the national project, and at other times appreciating the vitality and
durability of forms of governance that, without ... great resources,
continue to have social and political force. ' ' "s I have argued for a third
225. Id. at 245, 265-70 (arguing that these state and local initiatives are not necessarily inconsistent
with Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which vests the power to make treaties in the President).
226. Id. This dialogic approach draws inspiration from the work of Robert Cover and Alex
Aleinikoff. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus
and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1047-48 (1977) (proposing a model of federal-state interaction and
dialogue to address conflict and indeterminacy in the context of habeas law). They argue for an
approach that links national and subnational governments in dialogue about rights by "creat[ing] areas
of overlap in which neither system can claim total sovereignty." Id. at 1048. While Cover and
Aleinikoff call their conceptual framework "dialectical federalism," for my purposes, I use the term
"dialogic federalism" to stress the central importance of dialogue in implementing international
norms.
New modes of dialogue and deliberation concerning international human rights treaty norms are
needed in the United States because of the deep skepticism regarding the democratic legitimacy of
international treaty law. For an example of skepticism regarding foreign and international law, see
Justice Scalia's dissents in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting), in which he criticizes the majority's
reliance on foreign and international law. See also Antonin Scalia, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court,
Keynote Address at the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting: Foreign Legal
Authority in the Federal Courts (2004). See also proposed House Resolution 1658, which would bar
the Supreme Court from considering foreign and international law in interpreting the Constitution.
H.R. 1658, io9th Cong. (2005). As alluded to earlier, this skepticism stems in part from the absence of
mechanisms to ensure popular participation in the making and implementation of treaty law at
international and domestic levels. Supra Part III.B.i. For further discussion of this point, see Powell,
Dialogic Federalism, supra note 29, at 251-52, 255-62.
227. Id. at 250. Other scholars have subsequently highlighted the value of a "dialogic approach" in
other contexts. See, e.g., Sunder, Piercing the Veil, supra note 12, at 1458. In discussing the work of
Muslim feminists whose community-based trainings provide opportunities for deliberation through
critical engagement of both religious and human rights texts, Sunder advocates shifting from "an
impositional to a dialogic approach." Id. In this context, Sunder explains that a dialogical approach
enables Muslim feminists to navigate the tensions between Muslim traditions, international human
rights concepts, and evolving notions of gender equality." Id. at 1449.
228. Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism's Options, 14 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 465, 500 (1996)
(concluding a symposium on "Constructing a New Federalism: Jurisdictional Competition and
Competence").
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approach, premised on dialogue and intergovernmental relations as a
way to negotiate, rather than avoid, the conflict and indeterminacy
inherent in the implementation of international human rights law.
Certainly, the international legal system is premised on traditional,
monolithic notions of the nation-state, and the federal government must
be able to speak with "one voice" in international affairs."9 However, as
regards domestic application of international human rights law,
competing claims for authority between the federal and subfederal levels
is desirable-so long as mechanisms exist to channel and resolve conflicts
in interpretation. By creating opportunities for negotiation and dialogue,
these competing claims can provide a means to clarify, articulate and
convert abstract international human rights norms into concrete,
practical, and democratically-accepted domestic laws and policies. With
the "disaggregation" of sovereignty,3 ' permeability of national borders, 3'
and ascendancy of a transnational civil society, 32 it is hardly surprising
that international human rights law seeps into our national legal culture
through multiple points of entry. 33
These interactions among various levels of government, between the
229. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,381 (2000) (emphasizing the need for the
President "to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments").
230. See SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 92 (1998) ("[T]here is an
unbundling of sovereignty[:] ... the relocation of various components of sovereignty onto
supranational, nongovernmental, or private institutions."); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law
in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503, 505, 537 (1995) (describing "a world of liberal
States," in which the state and sovereignty are disaggregated into "component political institutions");
Anne-Marie Slaughter, supra note 114, at 183-84 ("The state is not disappearing, it is disaggregating
into its separate, functionally distinct parts. These parts ... are networking with their counterparts
abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental order."). See
generally Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1223 (1999) (extending
Professor Slaughter's disaggregation thesis to include disaggregation of federal and subfederal actors).
231. See SASSEN, supra note 230.
232. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995) ("[ELven [the largest and most powerful States]
cannot achieve their principal purposes ... without the help and cooperation of many other
participants in the system, including entities that are not states at all."); MARGARET E. KECK &
KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVIST BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 3-5
(1998) (describing transnational advocacy networks as communication structures that use information
strategically "[t]o influence discourse, procedures, and policy" on an international scale); Tadashi
Yamamoto & Jessica T. Mathews. Foreword to THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL
SOCIETY, at vi (Ann M. Florini ed., 2000) ("[B]order-spanning networks [that comprise transnational
civil society] are a real and enduring force in the international relations of the twenty-first century.");
Benvenisti, supra note 204, at 169 (advocating a "transnational conflict paradigm" that "shows how
domestic interest groups often cooperate with similarly situated foreign interest groups in order to
impose externalities on rival domestic groups"); Koh, Frankel Lecture, supra note 205, at 647-48
(describing the role of transnational norm entrepreneurs, i.e., those who assist states to internalize
norms in the transnational legal process).
233. Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: From Shelley v. Kraemer to CEDAW and Kyoto, American
Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports, 115 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2006)
(draft on file with author).
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domestic and the international, and between the public and private
(including NGOs), result in an iterative process in which legal rules
emerge and are interpreted, internalized and enforced. 34 This iterative
process "not only generat[es] law.., but generat[es] new interpretations
of those rules and internalize[es] them into domestic law[.]" 35 Therefore,
rather than facilitate mere transmission of the international, this iterative
process can assist in the process of translation of international to
national."' "Just as we know that translation from one language to
another requires more than literalness, we must recognize the creativity,
and therefore the uncertainty, involved in domestic interpretation [of
international law]." 237 So, while translation owes fidelity to the other's
language and text (the "other" here being international law), it also
requires assertion of one's own language as well ("one's own" being
domestic law).138 "The ideal is ... neither wholly international nor wholly
national, but a hybrid that express[es] the relationship between them."239
The negotiation between international and domestic legal regimes, and
the hybridity that results, are the driving force behind translation of
broad international principles into concrete articulation of rights that are
relevant and meaningful in a particular domestic context."a The creativity
and uncertainty inherent in translation of international to domestic law
provides a space for deliberation, debate, and learning.'
The translation metaphor is particularly apt in theorizing about
domestic implementation of international law in the U.S. context,
"because it captures the foreignness that many Americans associate with
international law. 2.42 As a formal matter, ratified treaties and customary
international law are law of the land of the United States. However, as a
practical matter, international law is often viewed as an alien source of
law. By adapting international human rights law to fit the particular local
context, a dialogic approach involving subnational actors facilitates
translation at various sites with broader participation, ensuring thicker,
more complex understandings of human rights.
Besides the value of building political momentum toward national
ratification, this local treaty work also facilitates translation of abstract
international law principles into more relevant, meaningful,
234. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 114, at 184.
235. Id. at 186.
236. Knop, supra note 191, at 505-06.
237. Id. at 506.
238. Id. (citing JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL
CRITICISM 264 (1990)).
239. Id.
240. Cf. id. at 507 (citing Homi K. Bhabha, The Commitment to Theory, NEW FORMATIONS,
Summer 1988, at 5, 22).
241. See Riles, supra note 89, at 278.
242. Powell, Dialogic Federalism, supra note 29, at 251.
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democratically legitimate local standards. Assuming the federal
government eventually adopts CEDAW, the knowledge and experience
gained at the state and local level could help inform implementation at
the national and even international levels. In this way, local work on the
periphery may help redefine the meaning of human rights law at the
center of the international system, undermining the dichotomy between
core and periphery.243 Rather than play a passive role, however, the
federal government could play a more proactive role by distilling lessons
from the local experiments, monitoring best practices, and pooling
information. Gathering this information would be valuable in that the
federal government could learn what implementation strategies work
and what grassroots structures are necessary for effective
implementation.2" Then, in turn, the federal government can share these
workable implementation strategies both subnationally and
transnationally.
CONCLUSION
One could view with despair the federal government's failure to
ratify CEDAW. This failure is rooted in the traditional structure of
international law, which derives primarily from the will and consent of
national governments. However, rather than view these conditions with
despair, one can interpret this failure as a result of our democracy at
work. So long as Americans do not understand the relevance of
international human rights treaties, our elected officials will not act to
ratify them. A more participatory, democratic approach to domestic
implementation of human rights law views these institutional realities "as
creating the occasion for, indeed in part anticipating, a radical re-
definition of our democratic and constitutional ideals." '45 Thus, this
Article takes the optimistic view that these conditions provide an
opportunity to reconceptualize avenues for deliberation concerning
human rights treaties law.
243. Cf. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 126, at 445.
244. Cf. Deveaux, supra note 166, at 783.
245. OLIVER GERSTENBERG & CHARLES F. SABEL, DIRECTLY-DELIBERATIVE POLYARCHY: AN
INSTITUTIONAL IDEAL FOR EUROPE? 5 (2000), at http://www2.1aw.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/gerst-
sabelo29.doc.
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